to relating to delinquent officers would have a decided tendency to prevent this question from arising in future.

Very truly yours,

D. M. CAMPBELL,
Attorney General.

By DAN B. CAREY,

Assistant.

IN RE

MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANIES.

A domestic Mutual Fire Insurance Association is subject to the supervision of the Insurance Department after discontinuing business until the affairs of the association have been settled up and its policies then in force shall have expired.

State of Colorado, Attorney General's Office. Denver, Colorado, May 29, 1899.

Dear Sir I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your official communication, under date of May 23, 1899, which is in part as follows:

"A mutual fire insurance company incorporated pursuant to the laws of Colorado and regularly admitted to do business in the state by the Insurance Department thereof and in the possession of a certificate of authority to that effect covering the year 1899, advises the department, through its Vice President, that it has decided to transact no more business; makes formal application for withdrawal and returns the certificate of authority heretofore issued.

"I beg to request an answer to the following question: Are the responsibilities of the Insurance Department with respect to such a company and the public concluded by the action indi

cated above and does such a company, having taken the action indicated, stand to this department as if it had never been admitted to do business?"

The statutes of this state establishing an insurance department for the state of Colorado, and regulating insurance companies doing business therein, are defective and incomplete, and afford the Commissioner of Insurance but slight guidance and direction in the discharge of his duties. The insurance department is charged with the execution of all laws in relation to insurance companies doing business in the state of Colorado.

Our Supreme Court has said that,

"The purpose of the legislature in providing for the organization and maintenance of a State Insurance Department was to protect the interests of the large number of persons within the State who patronize corporations engaged in the business of insurance. Both joint-stock companies and mutual associations are recognized.

*

Spruance vs. Farmers' and Merchants' Insurance Co., 9 Colo., 73, 76.

The Supreme Court, in the same case, in speaking of mutual fire insurance associations, made use of the following language:

"They are subject to all provisions of the act that may be found applicable.' They must make annual reports to the superintendent of insurance, showing their assets, liabilities, moneys received and expended, character of business, etc. The superintendent of insurance has almost unlimited power in the investigation of their affairs and management."

Spruance vs. Farmers' and Merchants' Insurance Co., 9 Colo., 73, 79.

While the statutes are silent as to the powers of the Insurance Department over domestic mutual fire insurance associations that have discontinued business in this state, I am of the opinion that the declara

tion by an association of its intention to cease doing business in the state does not relieve the Insurance Department of all responsibility in the premises, but that the authority of the department over such association continues to the same extent as theretofore existing, until such time as the affairs of such association shall have been settled up and its policies then in force shall have expired or been cancelled.

By surrendering its certificate of authority to do business the association deprives itself of the right to solicit or write any new business in this state, but I do not believe that such action on the part of the association relieves your department of all responsibility or deprives you of all supervision over the association. In my opinion, it is your duty to exercise the same supervision over the association which you have heretofore exercised under the statutes until such time as its affairs shall be completely settled up, its outstanding policies shall have expired or have been cancelled, and it shall cease to do any further business with its policy holders.

Very respectfully yours,

D. M. CAMPBELL,

Attorney General.

By CALVIN E. REED,

Assistant.

TO HON. H. H. EDDY,

Deputy Superintendent of Insurance,

Capitol Building, City.

IN RE

RELIEF BILLS.

Payable in the order of the taking effect of the several acts.

State of Colorado,

Attorney General's Office.

Denver, Colorado, June 9, 1899.

Dear Sir:--During our conversation of yesterday and today I was placed, by you, in possession of the following facts:

The Twelfth General Assembly of the state of Colorado passed fourteen separate acts, all of the same general character, each making an appropriation for a particular purpose therein specified, and all of which have been classified by you for convenience as "Relief Bills." Ten of said acts contain emergency clauses, and they therefore took effect immediately upon the executive approval thereof. The same were approved between the 13th day of April, A. D. 1899, at 9:45 o'clock a. m. of said day, and the 29th day of April, A. D. 1899, at the hour of 11:55 o'clock a. m. of said last mentioned day. The remaining four acts were approved between the 13th and the 20th days of April, A. D. 1899, and, being without emergency clauses, do not take effect for a period of ninety days from and after the dates upon which they were respectively approved.

The aggregate amount of the appropriations contained in said fourteen acts exceed the sum of twelve thousand dollars, and there is now a surplus in the state treasury, of the revenues of the fiscal year 1895, of less than two thousand dollars; the said surplus, for the said fiscal year 1895, being all of the surplus

revenues of any fiscal year now in the state treasury which is applicable to the payment of the said “Relief Bills."

One of the said ten relief bills is for services rendered to the legislative department in the year 1899, and is specifically made payable out of the revenues of the fiscal year 1899. Another one of said ten relief bills is specifically made payable out of the surplus revenues of the fiscal year 1895, and the remaining eight of said relief bills are all made payable out of any moneys in the state treasury of the revenues of any fiscal year, not otherwise appropriated.

In response to your request for my official opinion as to the order in which the said "Relief Bills" shall be paid, I beg to advise you that the surplus revenues of any fiscal year remaining in the state treasury, after the payment of all of the expenses of that year and all of the appropriations made by the legis lature for that year, may be appropriated by the legislature for any lawful purpose or ordered by law to be transferred to the credit of any other fiscal year.

In re House Resolution, 15 Colo., 602.

In the payment of said "Relief Bills," assuming that the same are for valid claims against the state, it is your duty to draw your warrants in payment thereof, for the full amount appropriated by each act, in the order in which the same took effect, to the extent of any revenues in the state treasury available for that purpose. The mere fact that one of said ten acts passed with an emergency clause and is specifically made payable out of the surplus revenues of the year 1895, does not give to that act a preference over other acts making appropriations out of any moneys in the state treasury of the revenues of any fiscal year, not otherwise appropriated, but said act must be paid, if at all, in the order of its taking effect.

It will not be necessary, at this time, to determine the order of the payment of the said four acts