by the scope of the said act of 1899, and that therefore the said Board of Exposition Commissioners are invested with exclusive powers in relation to the mineral exhibit only. I prefer, however, to rest my opinion upon safer grounds. The Constitution of this state provides that "No bill, * * * shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed." Section 21, Article V. Our Supreme Court has held that "So much of any act as is not directly germane to the subject expressed in the title, is without force; that the provision * * *, is a mandatory declaration of an essential condition to the validity of legislative enactments." Central and Georgetown Road Company vs. The People, 5 Colo., 39, 41. If the latter part of the said section 6 is given a literal construction, and it is held that the language used gives to the said Board of Exposition Commissioners general powers, then it is evidently a subject. not clearly expressed in the title of the act, and consequently void. Holding, as I do, that so much of said section 6 as attempts to confer general powers upon said Board of Exposition Commissioners is void, that language cannot, therefore, be considered for the purpose of determining whether or not the act of 1899 is in conflict with the act of 1895, and would, therefore, result by reason of the conflict in repealing the former act, and cannot be considered for the purpose of invoking the repealing clause in section 14. The general purpose and scope of the text of the act of 1899, with the exception of that part of section 6 above referred to, is fully in accordance with its title, but the implied effect of the said language in section 6 is not so embraced, neither is it clearly expressed in the title of the act of 1899, nor is it germane to the subject therein mentioned. Miller vs. Edwards, 8 Colo., 528. Mulnix vs. Life Insurance Co., 23 Colo., 71, 80. "No repeal by implication can result from a provision in a subsequent statute when that provision is itself devoid of constitutional force. Thus, where the constitution requires the subject of enactment to be indicated in its title, it was held that an act was not to be deemed repealed by a later repugnant one, whose subject-matter, however, on the point of such inconsistency, was germane to nothing in its title." Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, Section 192, citing Miller vs. Edwards, 8 Colo., 528. "It has been said that a repeal of all laws inconsistent with a statute does not affect laws inconsistent with such parts thereof as are themselves unconstitutional and void." Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, "A prior statute will not be impliedly repealed by inconsistency with a subsequent unconstitutional one." 23 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, page 476, citing Miller vs. Edwards, 8 Colo., 528. When the unconstitutional portion of section 6 is eliminated, the two acts may, in my judgment, stand together. I therefore answer your second inquiry by saying that the representation as provided by section 1 of the act of 1895 in no manner conflicts with or interferes with the duties or the authority of the Board of Exposition Commissioners created by the act of 1899. The Board of Exposition Commissioners created by the said act of 1899 has full and exclusive power and authority in the matter of the collection, management and display of the mineral products of the state, but has no authority to make any other display or to represent the state of Colorado in any other manner at the Paris Exposition. Answering your third inquiry, it is my opinion that the act of 1895 is not repealed in whole, but is repealed in part, by the act of 1899, and the commission provided for by the act of 1895 is deprived, by the act of 1899, of all power or authority over the display of the mineral products of the state at the Paris Exposition. Respectfully, D. M. CAMPBELL, Attorney General. By CALVIN E. REED, Assistant. To HON. CHARLES S. THOMAS, Governor, Capitol Building, City. IN RE THE STATE BOARD OF HEALTH. The State Board of Health has no authority to send a special health officer into a County or Municipality and charge the expense of so doing to such county or municipality. The State Board of Health, when acting in place of any county board as provided by Section 3456f, 3 M. A. S., may incur such expense, and such only, to be charged to the county, as might properly be incurred by said local board to be paid by the county. Two members of the county board of health acting informally have no power to bind the county by a contract to pay the expense of a special health officer sent to such county by the State Board. State of Colorado, Attorney General's Office. Denver, Colorado, May 23, 1899. G. E. TYLER, M. D., Secretary Colorado State Board of Health, Dear Sir--Your favor of the 15th instant is received, in which you ask for my opinion upon certain questions therein stated, as to the authority of the State Board of Health. In reply thereto I have the honor to submit the following: I deem it proper to call your attention to the fact that it is not part of the duty of the Attorney General under the statute to render official opinions to the State Board of Health, and that consequently opinions so given can be considered only as legal advice. I quote from your letter as follows: "In case the local health officers, that is, the board of County Commissioners, do not take proper measures to suppress an outbreak of small-pox, * * * has the State Board a right to send in a special health officer and collect the expenses from the county?" The board of county commissioners of each county in our state, is by law constituted a board of health for that county, and the powers and duties of such board when acting as a board of health, are fixed and prescribed by Division 3, Chapter 101, page 930, 3 Mills' Annotated Statutes. Section 3546f, Mills' Annotated Statutes, third volume, is as follows: "In the event of the local board of health of any community being unable or unwilling to efficiently or promptly abate a nuisance, or to prevent the introduction or spread of any contagious or infectious disease the State Board of Health shall have full power to take such measures as will insure the abatement of the nuisance, or prevent the introduction or spread of disease. The State Board of Health may, for this purpose, assume all the powers conferred by law on the local board of health; or the state board of health may, at its discretion, bring suit against or prosecute any local board of health for a wilful failure to enforce the laws of this state in regard to health, and the expense of carrying out such orders shall be borne by the local board of health so failing to enforce the law." By the provisions of the above section, it will be seen that in a case of failure on the part of the local board of health to take sufficient measures to prevent the introduction or spread of smallpox, the State Board of Health has authority to take charge of the matter and to do what is necessary to be done in the premises, and is, for that purpose, clothed with the authority given by law to the local board of health. By reference to said division 3 of chapter 101, above mentioned, it will be seen that the local board of health is authorized to take such measures and adopt such regulations as shall to them seem necessary for the purpose of preventing the introduction or spread of contagious diseases endangering the pub-. lic health, and to incur certain expenses to be paid |