It was upon such a statute that actions on ac count of property destroyed in the Pittsburg riots were founded. Similar actions in Illinois are also based upon a statute. County of Allegheny vs. Gibson, etc., 90 Penn. State, 397. Coal Co. vs. City, 65 Ill. Appellate Ct. There is, however, no such statute in this state, and if there were it would not create any liability on the part of the state which would amount to a previous authority of law for this claim. In answer to this inquiry I might have contented myself with calling the attention of your committee to the opinion of my predecessor upon this same claim above referred to. I have assumed, however, that your request for a second opinion from this office was made upon the theory that some new facts or authorities could be adduced which were not before fully considered. I have, therefore, gone into the matter at length. While I fully agree with Attorney General Carr, in that portion of the opinion cited above where he says, "The preamble of the bill recites a state of facts which must appeal to the sympathy of the general assembly, or any other body of men who are prompted by instincts of justice," I also agree with him in the conclusion that damages of the character described in the bill cannot in any view of the matter be held to constitute a claim against the state sanctioned by "previous authority of law," not even when the term law as used in the Constitution is given the broadest interpretation contended for by claimants. Very truly yours, D. M. CAMPBELL, Attorney General, By DAN B. CAREY, Assistant. IN RE STATE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE. The provision. of the statute relating to the time of appointment of members of the State Board of Agriculture, is merely directory and incidental to the paramount duty of making the appointment. The appointing power may be used at any time before the adjournment of the Legislature. State of Colorado. Attorney General's Office. Denver, Colorado, April 22, 1899. HON. CHARLES S. THOMAS, Governor of the State of Colorado, Dear Sir-I have your favor of the 17th instant, in which you ask for my official opinion as to the validity of certain appointments of members of the Board of Agriculture. In reply thereto, I have the honor to submit the following: The State Board of Agriculture is constituted and established, and the appointment of its members provided for, by section 55, Mills' Annotated Statutes. That portion which relates to the appointing power is as follows: "The Governor, by and with the consent of the senate, on or before the third Wednesday of January of each biennial session of the general assembly, shall appoint two members of the board to fill the vacancies that shall next occur, which vacancies shall be so filled that at least one-half of the appointed members of the board shall be practical farmers." Your letter states that Messrs. P. A. Amiss and Harlen Thomas were by you appointed as members of said board, but that said appointments were made subsequent to the third Wednesday of January, 1899. You also state that said appointments were regularly submitted to the Senate and by that body duly confirmed. You ask whether, under the Constitution and the laws, this power of appointment may not be used at any time prior to the adjournment of the legislature. In People vs. Allen, 6 Wendell (N. Y.), 486, a statute of that state was under consideration, which provided that "the commanding officer of each brigade of infantry shall, on or before the first day of June in every year, appoint a brigade court martial." This court martial was not appointed until July. The question passed upon by the Supreme Court in that case was, whether or not, under the law, the brigade commander had power to appoint after the first of June, there being no appointment made under the letter of the statute "on or before the first day of June." It was held that the provision as to time was merely directory and could not be construed as a limitation upon the appointing power. I quote as follows from the opinion in that case: "So it may be said of this case, that as there is nothing in the nature of the power showing that it might not be as effectually exercised after the first day of June as before, and as the act giving it contains no prohibition to exercise it after that period, the naming of that day was a mere direction to the officer in relation to the manner of executing his duty. There is nothing in the nature of the power given, or in the manner of giving it, that justifies the inference that the time was mentioned as a limitation." The doctrine of the above case is mentioned with approval by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in a matter entitled, In Re Census Superintendent, 15 Rhode Island, 614. The question there arose upon a request submitted by the executive of the state to the Supreme Court, for an opinion as to the validity of the appointment of a census commissioner on January 5th, under a statute which provided that such com missioner should be appointed "at least six months previous to the date for taking the census," which statute also provided that said census must be taken on the first day of the following June. In that case it was held that the duty to appoint was paramount and essential, and that the limitation as to time was merely directory and incidental. The appointment was held to be valid. Our statute above quoted imposes on the Governor an imperative and essential duty,-to appoint members of the board. There is nothing in the nature of that duty which prevents it from being performed as well after as before the third Wednesday in January. There is nothing in the language of the statute which prohibits an appointment at a later date, and nothing which in any manner indicates that the time mentioned was intended to operate as a limitation upon the appointing power. As stated in your letter, your predecessors have rarely made appointments upon this board until after the time mentioned in the statute. At least one, and probably both of the members who are succeeded by your recent appointees, were appointed after the statutory time. It is my opinion, therefore, that the provision of the statute relating to the time of making the appointment, is merely directory and incidental to the exercise of the appointing power, and that such power may properly be used at any time prior to the adjournment of the legislature. Your letter requests a reply not later than the present date. I have made such search of the Colorado authorities as I might in the limited time at my disposal, but do not find that the question has been determined by our courts. Very truly yours, D. M. CAMPBELL, By DAN B. CAREY, Assistant. IN RE STATE BOARD OF HEALTH. Creation of. Members appointed by the Governor; Term of office. State of Colorado. Attorney General's Office. Denver, Colorado, May 5, 1899. G. E. TYLER, M. D., Secretary of the State Board of Health, Dear Sir-Your favor of the 3rd instant is received, wherein, under the direction of the State Board of Health, you make several inquiries relative to the appropriation made by the legislature to meet the expenses of said board. In reply thereto, I have the honor to submit the following: The State Board of Health, as it now exists, was created by an act of the legislature, approved April 15, 1893. The members are appointed by the Governor for six years, and their terms of office expire January 31st. The appropriations made by the different legislatures, are, by the act creating said board, directed to be expended in the manner deemed best by the board for carrying out the objects for which it was created. The Twelfth General Assembly appropriated to meet the expenses of the board and to pay the salary of the secretary, the sum of three thousand dollars; fifteen hundred dollars for the year 1899 and fifteen hundred dollars for the year 1900. The fiscal year in |