erally it will be seen that all possible activity and promptitude was used in sending forward troops to the points threatened along the Missouri river, and meeting with all our disposable force the movements of General Price. It will be seen that up to the 13th Boonesville, and not Lexington, was considered the threatened point. On the 14th General Sturgis was directed to move with all practicable speed upon Lexington. General Pope's despatch of the 16th gave me every reason to believe as he did—that a re-enforcement of 4,000 men, with artillery, would be there in abundant time; and, if the committee will take the time to read the accompanying papers, it will be seen that from every quarter where there were disposable troops the promptest efforts were made to concentrate them on Lexington, but chance defeated these efforts. Also on the 14th, in the midst of this demand for troops, I was ordered by the Secretary of War and General Scott to "send 5,000 well armed infantry to Washington without a moment's delay." It will in some degree explain my condition to insert the following telegram: [Vol. 2, page 96.] HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, St. Louis, September 15, 1861. Reliable information from the vicinity of Price's column shows his present force to be 11,000 at Warrensburg and 4,000 at Georgetown, with pickets extending towards Syracuse. Green is making for Boonesville with probable force of 3,000. Withdrawal of force from this part of the Missouri risks the State; from Paducah, loses western Kentucky. At the best, I have ordered two regiments from this city, two from Kentucky, and will make up the remainder from the new force being raised by the governor of Illinois. Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND, J. C. FREMONT, Major General Commanding. Ass't Adj't Gen'l, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C. It is well to recall the fact that the State of which I had the task to obtain possession, and which was in active rebellion, contained a white population of over a million-equal to that of Virginia, and 150,000 greater than that of Kentucky-and that the difficulties were increased by the fact that the several important points needed to be occupied for that purpose were very distant from the centre of operations at St. Louis, with long lines of communication to be kept open, in the midst of a brave and enterprising enemy. To St. Joseph, 330 miles; to Sedalia, 189 miles; to Jefferson City, 125 miles; to Rolla, 118 miles; to Ironton, about 80 miles; to Cairo and Paducah, 200 miles. HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, Subjoined is a list of our total force, with its distribution: St. Louis, (including Home Guard). Under Brigadier General Pope, (including Home Guard) Jefferson City, (one quarter Home Guard). Rolla Ironton Cape Girardeau.... Bird's Point and Norfolk... Cairo, (including McClernand's brigade). 6, 899 5, 488 2,400 9,677 4,700 3,057 650 3,510 4,826 To these difficulties began now to be added the loss of consideration and credit, which the apparent withdrawal of the confidence of the government caused. The visit of high officers charged with inquiring into the affairs of my department, and the simultaneous and sustained attacks of leading journals, accumulated obstructions to my movements until I was openly removed from the command of the department. Except the victory, little advantage resulted to Price from the capture of Lexington, exposed and resting upon a broad river, which there was no chance for a large army to cross in case of defeat. As a military position, its occupation had no value for him. On the contrary, had I possessed the means of transportation to move forward my troops rapidly, Ishould have been well content to give up Lexington for the certainty of being able to compel Price to give me battle on the north side of the Osage; as he could not cross the Missouri without exposing himself to certain defeat, no other course would have remained open to him. In fact, when I did go forward, the appearance of my advance at Sedalia was the signal for his precipitate retreat. I ask the attention of the committee to the unreasonableness of expecting a general to be always successful. Admitting even that the western department had been thoroughly well supplied with men and arms, it could scarcely have been expected that no single casualty could have been met with in the course of the campaign. And it would seem more reasonable to judge of the capacity of the commander by the general results of his operations. From this statement, and the accompanying papers, the committee will form some idea of the condition of the department when I assumed command at the end of July. At the end of October, when I had succeeded in organizing and equipping an army, and was beginning to handle it in the field, we were everywhere, and uniformly along the whole extent of our lines, successful against the enemy. At Springfield one of the most brilliant actions, and at Fredericktown one of the most admirably conducted battles of the war had been fought. Isolated railroads had all been connected at St. Louis, and were in full and continuous operation over their whole extent. Additional cars had been provided, and at twenty-four hours' notice 10,000 men could be moved upon them from any one point to the opposite side of the State. All our posts, so far as the railroad went, had been fortified and connected by telegraphs, which were everywhere in full operation, and the daily mails were running to Springfield, from which place an officer, alone and in uniform, could ride through with safety to St. Louis. Quiet and comparative peace had been restored to the State, and the enemy was in full retreat before us to its southern boundary. A compact had been entered into with him, under which the authority of the State and federal courts was acknowledged, liberty of opinion and security of person were guarantied to both sides, all guerilla parties suppressed, and the war strictly confined to responsible officers and the armies in the field. The State was in reality reclaimed, and in condition to leave the army free for the especial object of descending the Mississippi. The rebels already acknowledged the inutility of resistance to the federal authority; the doubtful came to the side of power, and the loyal who had borne the brunt of war, when to stand by the Union involved danger and losses, were everywhere encouraged to new efforts, and rewarded for their past aid. The fall rains were over; the fine weather of the Indian summer had come; the hay was gathered and corn hardening, and we were about to carry out the great object of our campaign, under the most favorable auspices, with fewer hardships from exposure, and impediments from transportation, than at any other season. The spirit of the army was high. It was mainly composed of western men, whose interest as well as whose patriotism was involved in the opening of the Mississippi river, for the preparations to which they had contributed every possible effort, and we had every reason to believe that the campaign would open with a signal victory in the defeat or dispersion of the rebel army, with a move on Memphis as the immediate result. These were the circumstances under which, without reason assigned, I was relieved of my command. It is not grateful to me to have been myself compelled to set out the merits of my administration; but it was necessary in order to bring attention to points which otherwise might not have been presented, and which are necessary to a clear understanding of the subjects inquired into. Many acts which have been censured were, I think, for the public good. I know they were with that intention. I do not feel that in any case I overstepped the authority intended to be confided to me. Myself and the officers and men acting with me were actuated solely by a desire to serve the country. And I feel assured that this is realized by the people of the west, among whom we were acting. After consultation by the committee Mr. Gooch was instructed to take the statement and papers submitted by General Frémont and examine them, with a view to determine what further inquiries it might be deemed necessary to make. The witness was informed that when Mr. Gooch should have prepared himself for the further examination the committee would call him before them. The witness: I shall be ready at any time to answer any questions the committee may desire to propound to me. [Examination consequently suspended for the present.] WASHINGTON, January 30, 1862. General JOHN C. FREMONT-examination resumed. By Mr. Gooch: Question. Will you state concisely what powers were given you were assigned to the command of the western department? when you Answer. No specific powers were given to me. But no restriction whatever was placed upon me in taking command of the department. Question. Did you understand that, you had the right, or were expected, to exercise any powers other than those which you held by virtue of your commission as major general? Answer. I understood and expected to exercise any and whatever power was necessary to carry out the work I was sent to accomplish. Question. Whether strictly within the limits of the power conferred by your commission or not? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. From whom did you derive your power in that respect? Answer. From the President, and from conversations with the Secretary of War and Mr. Blair, the Postmaster General; neither of whom used any expression which implied a restriction of power. On the contrary, the drift of the conversation was to the effect that I should exercise any power required. I have heard that the President said to the Illinois delegation to Mr. Trumbull, perhaps that he had given me more power than he had himself. I would like to remark, in passing, that I do not think it was clearly understood what was the nature of the power which a general commanding a department had. By the chairman : Question. All the powers incident and necessary to carry out the object to be obtained were given? Answer. That is precisely the point. By Mr. Gooch: Question. Did you appoint military officers to act under you; and if so, why, and by virtue of what authority? Answer. I did appoint such officers, and because they were necessary to the proper organization of the army, and the carrying out of the military operations. I did it under the authority of the Secretary of War and of the President of the United States, and under the general authority given to me. Question. Do I understand that it was expected that, when you left Washington to assume the command of your department, you would exercise that power? Answer. If I thought of it at all, I did. The governor of Missouri hesitated to appoint officers for the force raised in Missouri. A despatch was sent to the President or through a cabinet officer to the President-asking him if he would confirm the officers appointed by me; to that effect, I think. At all events, the President replied that he would do so. And in all cases when I appointed officers they were appointed subject to the confirmation of the President; to be commissioned by him; so the commissions ran that I gave them. If the President approved the appointments, then they were to receive their. commissions. Their appointment was necessary to the organization of the force in that department. We had to take officers wherever we could find them throughout the country. Question. When you left Washington for your department you knew, of course, that you would find a great deficiency of arms in the department. Answer. Yes, sir. Question. And you had an order for 7,000 stand of arms in New York? Question. Will you state the facts in relation to that order? Answer. I learned from the governor of Illinois that 7,000 of the Illinois contingent were unarmed. I went to the War Department and applied for arms for them. General Thomas went with me to Colonel Ripley, and he agreed to let me have 7,000 out of the number on hand, which, I think, was 25,000. He was to send them to three different points, named by me, on the Illinois river. I went on to New York, and the second day after reaching there I received a letter from Colonel Ripley to the effect that he thought the governor of Illinois was mistaken, and that those arms were not required, and, therefore, the order had not been issued for them. I sent that letter to Washington, and in reply I received a despatch informing me that the President would, himself, go to the War Department and arrange the matter for me. And in pursuance of that Major Hagner was sent to New York to endeavor to procure arms for the western department. I subsequently received an order for 5,000 mnskets, to be delivered to me from the St. Louis arsenal, but they were not there. I think, when I got to St. Louis, the arms of all descriptions in the arsenal then did not exceed 1,200 or 1,300. Question. What force did you find subject to your control upon your arrival at St. Louis? Answer. I found a nominal force of perhaps 25,000 men, but a real force not exceeding 15,000 men; what I mean by that is, that of the three months men, whose terms of service were just expiring, so that you could not count upon them at all; there were about 10,000 men; while of the three years' men who were either in Missouri or going to it, there were, perhaps, 15,000 men. The two would make about 25,000 men. Question. How was the force armed? Answer. It was armed with all kinds of arms; some with rifled guns, and some with smooth bores. A small body of cavalry, of regular cavalry, I think, were armed with sabres. Question. Was the whole of this force in possession of arms that could be used in the field? Answer. I suppose they were, all except 7,000, for which, as I have before stated, I had no arms at all. Question. When you were in New York was your attention called to what has since been known as the Austrian muskets? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. Did you examine them? Answer. I looked at them. How far I examined them I do not recollect. Question. Did you form an opinion of them at the time? Answer. I probably did. Question. Can you state what that opinion was? Answer. I cannot state the opinion from recollection. I can state what I suppose the opinion must have been. I probably did not take the muskets then, because they differed somewhat from the arm in regular use in our service. Question. Were those arms subsequently purchased? Answer. Yes, sir; probably the same arms. Question. Purchased in pursuance of your order? Answer. By my direct order. Question. To whom was your order given for the purchase of those arms? Answer. I purchased them by telegraph from St. Louis, addressed to a firm. in New York, Kruse, Drexel & Schmidt, the firm that held them. They offered me the arms, and after some interchange of despatches I purchased them. Question. What was the price agreed to be paid for them? Question. Will you state the reason for purchasing those arms after having seen them and considering that there were some objections to them? Answer. Because I was in very pressing need of arms. We had no arms to furnish the regiments. We had plenty of men, but no arms. We were endeavoring to send re-enforcements to different points to meet the enemy in the field. We wanted arms for the troops to send to General Lyon, and for all our military operations. Question. There were 25,000 of those arms? Answer. Yes, sir. 13,000 new and 12,000 that had been in service. Question. Was not your first proposition to purchase a part of them only? Answer. Yes, sir. Question. What was the reason that that was not done? Answer. Because they would not sell to me without selling the whole of them; and I was afraid to wait long, because I supposed they would go to some other quarter to sell them. Question. At that time was there not a great competition in the market for arms? Answer. There was; at least I could get none. And in my judgment there could not have been-probably would not occur during the war-a greater ne |