Springfield either on the morning of the fifth or the sixth. We commenced the march back on the fourth. I have been trying to recall whether we were two days or three days in making our march back, but I will not be positive. The enemy, at the same time, were moving on a different road south of us towards Springfield. I commanded the rear guard of six companies the day of our starting back, and I could see the dust raised by the enemy's troops three or four miles on our left. They were evidently moving up towards Springfield on another road. I think it was the morning of the fifth that we reached Springfield. The question then arose, that morning, whether we would remain at Springfield and defend ourselves until we received re-enforcements, or whether we would continue our retreat right on towards Rolla or towards Fort Scott. Arriving at Springfield tolerably early-about 10 o'clock in the morning-we could have made some ten or fifteen miles further that day. General Lyon consulted several officers in regard to that among the number was myself. Those whom he had known intimately he consulted. There were a great many prominent citizens of the neighborhood came around him, good Union people, urging him to remain. My own opinion was that we ought to remain a few days. We could defend ourselves; or, at least, we did not anticipate an immediate attack, probably not in four or five days. But my opinion was that we should wait at least two or three days for re-enforcements. He stated that he had repeatedly written for re-enforcements and was not expecting any. That he stated in the first council. He made the remark to me-on one occasion in private conversation-that he had written and telegraphed for re-enforcements; that he was aware that regiments had been sent out of Missouri after he had applied for re-enforcements, for what reason he did not know. And he did not know why he had not received any re-enforcements. Whether that be the case or not, I cannot say. I merely state what he said in conversation with me.

By the chairman:

Question. Did he say where they had been sent?

Answer. No, sir. Only they had been sent out of Missouri. The day we returned to Springfield our troops remained under arms, and waited some three or four hours while this matter was being considered. After the consultation was concluded in regard to our movements, General Lyon ordered the troops into camp; a decision which I believe was approved by all the officers. We lay there until the evening of the 9th, making one or two litexcursions out during the time in pursuit of detached parties of the enemy. I think about that time we received a few wagon loads of supplies from Rolla, which gave us some five or six days rations. On the afternoon of the 9th we received marching orders.

In the conversations of General Lyon with his officers the only questions that arose were, whether we should intrench ourselves at Springfield and wait for re-enforcements, or retreat upon Rolla; or rather, if we retreated, whether we would retreat upon Rolla or upon Fort Scott, the distance to each place being about the same. Fort Scott lay just on the other side of the Missouri line, in Kansas: Rolla was at the end of a railroad. The determination to fight the battle of Springfield was his own-at least he did not consult me. I do not know whether he consulted other officers or not. But I would remark here, that I was afterwards notified that General Lyon adopted the wisest course. We had a valuable train, estimated at over half a million of dollars. There was aboard that train between $200,000 and $250,000 in specie. Had we retreated at once upon Rolla we would probably have had to fight every day on our retreat. It was a bad road of 110 miles, and being encumbered with a very large train our retreat might

have resulted in the loss of a large portion of that train. To have intrenched ourselves in Springfield, being in doubt whether or not we should get any re-enforcements, and being in want of provisions, was a matter of perhaps rather doubtful policy.

On the afternoon of the 9th of August we marched out to fight the enemy. I do not think that General Lyon was aware of their real strength. He estimated them at 15,000 men. Our force with which we left Springfield was about 4,800 men. We had about 5,500 men there; but we had to leave a guard for the train in town, and then there were many of the men sick, and on extra duty, &c., which reduced our marching force to about 4,800. Of that number General Sigel had about 1,500: the two German regiments, one battery of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry. And in the consideration of the battle itself, General Sigel's force should be thrown out entirely, because his whole force was dispersed and his battery captured within a half an hour after the fight commenced. So that the battle itself was fought with about from 3,300 to 3,500 men against 23,000; for we ascertained afterward that to have been their numbers. Of our forces there were seven companies of regular infantry, and two batteries of artillery-I suppose altogether not over 600 regulars--and the rest were volunteers: the two Kansas regiments, the 1st Missouri, and the 2d Iowa, whose time had expired at that time.

I have but little more to say in regard to the battle, except that we whipped them. I was with my battalion in the advance that morning; we marched out the night before, and just laid down in the bushes about 12 or 1 o'clock. It rained upon us, and we had nothing to eat the next morning. I think very few of us had anything to eat that day-at least I did not. The battle commenced about 5 o'clock in the morning. It was a complete surprise; we surprised their camps. I drove in one of their pickets not. more than a half a mile from their camp, and they had not even time to give the alarm in the camp before our guns opened upon them. The battle lasted from 5 o'clock until about half-past 11. They came up four distinct times to attack us, bringing up fresh troops each time.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Each time in force?

Answer. Yes, sir; each time in force, bringing up fresh troops.

By the chairman:

Question. Why did General Lyon pursue Rains when you first started if he had not a force sufficient?

Answer. McCulloch and Rains had not united, and the object was to prevent their doing so.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Will you give us the particulars of that fight?

Answer. I cannot particularize it. I was on the left myself, and carried forward the left attack. I was separated, with my battalion, from the main portion of the army by a creek. I was a quarter or a half a mile from the main portion of our army. I fought, for upwards of an hour, with 250 regulars, over 2,000 of the enemy, and was forced to retreat. I was severely wounded, and in the course of an hour and a half was myself in an ambulance.

Question. You did not see the latter part of the action?

Answer. No, sir. I can only state what officers have told me. My battalion was saved by Dubois's battery on that occasion. I found that I had overwhelming forces against me, and that my left flank was going to be turned. I had a creek behind me, with a dense chapparal bordering it on

both sides, which was almost impenetrable except in one or two places. I came to the conclusion to fall back. I lost 49 men, in the course of an hour, out of 250.

Question Can yon state the casualties in our army?

Answer. I have Major Sturgis's official report. The casualties I can state to be over 1,200-I think over 1,300 killed and wounded. There were not certainly over 3,500 men of ours in action in the first place.

Question. Can you give a description of those four charges of the enemy from hearsay; that is, from the accounts of the officers engaged; particularly the last one?

Answer. I do not know that I could give you a description of it. I have heard officers speak of it; but in ordinary conversation each one describes the particular part of the field where he was himself; and it requires considerable reflection to put those different things together to connect properly the different incidents in the different parts of the field.

Question. I will say that Major Schofield stated to me that after the last repulse it was a perfect rout; that the enemy fled in the wildest confusion. Answer. Yes, sir; everybody says that.

Question. And he also stated that in attempting to ride forward to reconnoitre and see where the enemy were, their dead was piled up so thick that he could not ride over them, but had to make a considerable detour.

Answer. There was a flag of truce sent out after our return to Springfield, as I heard. A young doctor of the army went out with it, with a few men and some wagons, to obtain the body of General Lyon, and to look for our wounded left on the field. He told me that General McCulloch remarked to a non-commissioned officer-a sergeant-who attended the party, "Your loss was very great, but ours was four times yours;" and I think it but a fair estimate to put their loss at least as high as four thousand men killed and wounded.

Question. After this battle you retired?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Can you give us the particulars of that retreat?
Answer. No, sir; except from hearsay.

Question. It was conducted in good order, and you were not pursued? Answer. Yes, sir; we were not pursued. The fact was the enemy was completely crippled. We gained everything that General Lyon proposed to gain.

Question. How many additional troops, in your estimation, would have given you a victory and enabled you to have driven the enemy out of Missouri?

Answer. My opinion is that our victory would have been perfect and complete with two additional regiments. They were running at the time. They burned their trains-we saw them burning-so that they should not fall into our hands. They did not burn the whole, but what they could conveniently. If we had known it, we could have held the field as it was, for afterwards we heard that they were out of ammunition; that is, they had but a few rounds left.

By the chairman:

Question. How long did General Lyon wait at Springfield before he undertook his expedition against Rains?

Answer. He waited from the 13th of July till the 1st of August.
Question. Still his army was inferior to that of the enemy?

Answer. Constantly inferior.

Question. Vastly inferior?

Answer. Yes, sir; vastly inferior.

Question. Why did he advance upon a foe so much his superior? Answer. The object of his advance I suppose was this: he had whipped the enemy at Boonville and pursued Jackson. Following him up, he was joined by the force at Kansas City and Leavenworth, with which detachment I was. His object was to overtake this force, whip them, and capture them or crush them out. But they, in retreating towards the Arkansas line, were constantly being re-enforced. When he commenced his pursuit they were not so far superior to his forces as they were afterwards. If he could have overtaken them on the Osage or the Grand river, he could have whipped them and captured them. That was his object. The reason why he did not do that was on account of the high water. The enemy burned the bridges as they fled, and it had rained incessantly for several days, and the whole country was flooded. We had to lay by two or three days at a time to get across the streams. In the mean time the enemy was re-enforced with Arkansas, Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas troops. They had troops from all those States.

Question. How long after you joined him at Springfield did he start on this expedition?

Answer. I joined him about a week before we reached Springfield.

Question. If I understand you, at the time he started upon that expedition the enemy's force was not so much superior to his own?

Answer. No, sir; he was pursuing the same force that he whipped at Boonville. Then there was a force that lay near Kansas City that joined Price afterwards.

Question. Why did he wait so long for re-enforcements before he started on this expedition?

Answer. He did not wait for re-enforcements at that time. He was delayed some three or four days getting transportation for his troops. Question. He was not waiting for re-enforcements?

Answer. No, sir; not at all. He only waited for re-enforcements after he reached Springfield, and found out what their strength was. Then, instead of advancing upon them, he waited for re-enforcements. The little advance that he made on the 1st of August was because he had an idea that he could divide their forces and whip them in detail. They had not united then. Rains had a separate column, Price had another, and McCulloch was coming up with re-enforcements. But at that time they were superior, very much superior, to our forces. I mean when we reached Springfield.

Question. They were much your superior then?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Then why did he pursue from Springfield a force so much his superior?

Answer. He pursued there to attack a separate column. He was going to adopt the idea of Napoleon to whip his enemy in detail, thinking he could overtake Rains and whip his forces, and thus cripple them. But they were all united at the battle of Springfield-Rains, Price, and McCulloch. Question. Did I understand you that he did not wait for re-enforcements at Springfield; and if not, where did he wait for them?

Answer. He waited at Springfield for them.

Question. I asked you, first, why, when the enemy had a superior force, he started on this expedition, for I understood you to say, just before that, that the force of the enemy was vastly superior to that of General Lyon. I understood you to say that the force was not so much superior when he started on the expedition, but it accumulated on the way.

Answer. I misunderstood you. When you referred to the starting of the expedition, I thought you referred to his starting from Boonville.

Question. I was trying to get at this. He had been waiting for re-en

forcements at Springfield which he did not get. I wanted to know why, with an inferior force, he set out on the expedition from Springfield against the enemy?

Answer. I will explain that as I understand it. General Lyon was aware that the combined forces of the enemy were vastly superior to ours. He stated in the council of war that they had 15,000 men-about three to our one. But he had his spies out, who gave him an idea where each column of the enemy was. There were re-enforcements for the enemy coming up which were within striking distance of there. When General Lyon marched from Springfield he marched out in pursuit of Rains and his one detachment of the enemy's forces, thinking he could overtake him and whip him before the others could come up. But Rains retreated, drawing us on, and as they were pursuing the road which led them towards Springfield, we fell back upon Springfield, because we could not abandon that place and our baggage trains and supplies. I am speaking now of the expedition from Springfield of the 1st of August. We returned, I think, on the morning of the 5th of August.

Question. How far is Springfield from St. Louis?

Answer. It is one hundred and ten miles from Rolla, and I believe Rolla is about the same distance from St. Louis. Springfield is about two hundred. and twenty miles from St. Louis.

Question. You made a stand at Springfield. Were you under the necessity of fighting a battle there, or could you have retreated still further from the enemy ? You say your forces at Springfield were vastly inferior to those of the enemy.

Answer. I will give you what I believe was General Lyon's idea at the time.

Question. Could he retreat before them, and if so would it have been prudent to have done it?

Answer. My opinion is that the wisest course was to fight in the way he did fight. General Lyon was mistaken in the strength of the enemy. He did not think they were over 15,000 men, when in fact they were over 20,000. But the attacking force always has the advantage, in the moral effort upon the troops and in everything. If you move forward troops even a hundred yards in time of action it gives them courage. If you fall back that distance it intimidates them. General Lyon's idea was to surprise their camp as we did; to make a bold dash on them when our men were full of courage and animation, and whip them or cripple them, which in fact was accomplished with the loss of his own life.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. So that they could not pursue?

Answer. Yes, sir. If we had retreated without that fight our forces would have been intimidated, and we would have had to fight every day, and perhaps lost a valuable train.

By the chirman:

Question. You say that General Lyon got no re-enforcements, and yet reenforcements were sent out of the State. You understood General Lyon to say so.

Answer. I understood General Lyon to say that regiments were sent out of Missouri. He did not state where, and I do not know.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. Do you know what forces were at St. Louis at that time?
Answer. I do not.

Question. And you do not know why re-enforcements were not sent to General Lyon?