ley said he could not get forward, having no control over the transportation by railroad. Leaving Jefferson City on the 13th, we arrived at Tipton at 9 o'clock a. m. The Secretary of War was called upon by General Frémont, and upon the general's invitation accompanied him to Syracuse, five miles distant, to review the division under General McKinstry, nearly eight thousand strong. This body of troops is said to be the best equipped and best supplied of the whole army. They certainly are, so far as means of transportation are concerned. At Tipton, besides General Frémont and staff, his body-guard, &c., I found part of General Hunter's 1st division, and General Asboth's 4th division. The force designed to act against Price consists of five divisions, as follows: First division, Hunter's, at Tipton... Total..... 9,750 9,220 7,980 6,451 5,388 38,789 As soon as I obtained a view of the several encampments at Tipton, I expressed the opinion that the forces there assembled could not be moved, as scarcely any means of transportation were visible. I saw General Hunter, second in command, and conversed freely with him. He stated that there was great confusion, and that Frémont was utterly incompetent; that his own division was greatly scattered, and the force then present defective in many respects; that he required one hundred wagons, yet he was ordered to march that day, and some of his troops were already drawn out on the road. His cavalry regiment (Ellis's) had horses, arms, (indifferent,) but no equipments; had to carry their cartridges in their pockets; consequently, on their first day's march from Jefferson City, in a heavy rain, the cartridges carried about their persons were destroyed. This march to Tipton (thirty-five miles) ⚫ was made on a miry, heavy earth road parallel to the railroad and but a little distance from it. The troops were directed by General Frémont to march without provisions, knapsacks, and without transportation. A violent rain. storm came up, and the troops were exposed to it all night; were without food for twenty-four hours, and when food was received the beef was found to be spoiled. General Hunter stated that he had just received a written report from one of his colonels, informing him that but twenty out of one hundred of his guns would go off. These were the guns procured by General Frémont in Europe. I may here state that General Sherman, at Louisville, made a similar complaint of the great inferiority of these European arms. He had given the men orders to file down the nipples. In conversation with Colonel Swords, assistant quartermaster general, at Louisville, just from California, he stated that Mr. Selover, who was in Europe with General Frémont, wrote to some friend in San Francisco that his share of the profits of the purchase of these arms was $30,000. When General Hunter, at Jefferson City, received orders to march to Tipton, he was directed to take forty-one wagons with him, when he had only forty mules, which fact had been duly reported to headquarters. At this time, Colonel Stevenson's 7th Missouri regiment was, without General Hunter's knowledge, taken from him, leaving him, when under marching orders, with only one regiment at Jefferson City fit to take the field.-(See paper No. 9.) General Hunter showed me the order for marching, dated October 10, which he only received the 12th.-(See paper No. 10. See Hunter's reply, showing the great wants of his command, marked No. 11.) The same day the order was changed to one day's march.-(See paper No. 12.) When General Pope, at Georgetown, twenty-five miles distant, received this order of march, he wrote a private letter to Hunter, which I read. It set forth the utter impossibility of his moving for the want of supplies and transportation, and asked whether General Frémont could mean what he said. All of the foregoing goes to show the want of military foresight and soldierly judgment on the part of General Frémont, in directing the necessary means for putting and maintaining in the field the forces under his command. General Hunter stated that, though second in command, he never was consulted by General Frémont, and knew nothing whatever of his intentions. Such a parallel, I venture to assert, cannot be found in the annals of military warfare. I have also been informed that there is not a Missourian on his staff-not a man acquainted, personally, with the topography and physical characteristics of the country or its people. The failure of General Frémont to re-enforce General Lyon demands brief notice. General Frémont arrived at St. Louis July 26, called thither from New York by telegraph, stating that General Lyon was threatened by 30,000 rebels. At this time General Pope had nine regiments in north Missouri, where the rebels had no embodied force, the confederate forces in the State being those under Price and McCulloch, near Springfield, southwest Missouri, and those under Pillow, Jeff. Thompson and Hardee, in southeast Missouri; two regiments held Rolla, the terminus of the southwestern branch of the Pacific railroad, whilst Jefferson City, Boonesville, Lexington and Kansas City bad each a garrison of three or four hundred men, behind intrenchments. Cairo and Bird's Point were fortified and defended with heavy artillery. (Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau were fortified after General Frémont's arrival.) All these places could be re-enforced by railroad and river from St. Louis and the northwestern States, and could hold out until re-enforced, even if attacked by superior forces. On his arrival in St. Louis, General Frémont was met by Captain Cavender, 1st Missouri, and Major Farrar, aidede-camp to General Lyon, with statements from the latter, and asking for re-enforcements. Major Phelps, member of Congress from Springfield, Doctor Miller, of Omaha, and many other citizens, having ample means of information, made the same representations and urged the sending of re-enforcements. To Governor Gamble he said: "General Lyon is as strong as any other officer on this line." He failed to strengtheu Lyon, and the result, as is well known, was the defeat of that most gallant officer. The two regiments at Rolla should have been pushed forward, and the whole of Pope's nine regiments brought by rail to St. Louis and Rolla, and thence sent to Lyon's force. Any other general, in such an emergency, would have pursued this obvious course. The battle of Springfield, (or more strictly Wilson's creek,) one of the most desperate ever fought on this continent, took place August 10, when the brave Lyon fell, and the troops, borne down by greatly superior numbers, were obliged to fall back, but unpursued by a badly beaten foe General Frémont called four regiments from North Missouri and went with them to Cairo. It is evident that he had no intention of re-enforcing General Lyon, for the two regiments at Rolla, 125 miles only from Springfield, received no orders to march, and were not supplied with transportation, and thirty or forty hired wagons, just returned from Springfield, were discharged at Rolla August 4, seven days before the battle, and returned to St. Louis. After the news of the battle reached St. Louis, four other regiments were drawn from Pope in North Missouri and sent to Rolla. Better to have called in these troops before the battle, as after the battle the whole revolutionary elements were called forth. The six regiments accomplished nothing, and were not ordered to advance and cover the retreat of Lyon's army, although it was supposed in St. Louis that Price and McCulloch were following it, and that Hardee had moved up to cut off its retreat on the Gasconade. An advance of these regiments would have enabled the army to retrace its steps, and to beat the forces of Price and McCulloch so badly that they would have been unable to follow our forces in their retreat. It is said that every officer in Lyon's army expected to meet re-enforcements, and to return with them and drive Price and McCulloch from the southwest. General Hunter arrived at St. Louis from Chicago, called thither on a suggestion from Washington as an adviser. General Frémont submitted to him, for consideration and advice, a paper called "Disposition for retaking Springfield." It sets out out with a statement that Springfield is the strong strategical point of that wide elevation which separates the waters of the Osage from those of the Arkansas; the key to the whole southwestern Missouri, commanding an area of nearly 60,000 miles. Why did not this enter the brain of the major general before the fall of Lyon, and he strain every nerve to hold that important key when in his possession? General Hunter, in answer to the paper, replied: "Why march on Springfield, where there is no enemy and nothing to take? Let me take the troops and proceed to Lexington," in which direction Price was marching, and where he expected to be joined by 40,000 rebels. Instead of this he was sent to Rolla, without instructions, and remained there until ordered to Jefferson City, still without instructions, and thence to Tipton, where we found him. (See Exhibit No. 13.) No steps having been taken by General Frémont to meet Price in the field, he moved forward his line of march, plainly indicating his intention of proceeding to Lexington. When within some thirty-five miles of the place, he remained ten or more days, evidently expecting that some movement would be made against him. None being made, he advanced and, with his much superior force, laid siege to Lexington, defeated by Mulligan with 2,700 men September 12, and captured it the 21st, nine days thereafter. Now for the facts to show that this catastrophe could have been prevented, and Price's army destroyed before or after that disastrous affair. Before Price got to Lexington the forces to resist him were as follows : Jefferson City, 5,500; at Rolla, 4,000; along the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, about 5,000; western line of Missouri, under Lane, down near Fort Scott, 2,300; Mulligan's force at Lexington, 2,700; a large force in Illinois, along the Mississippi river, and on the Iowa line; outside of St. Louis, some 17,000; in St. Louis, 18,000, but say 10,000. Hunter's plan, up to Sunday, 22d September, was to concentrate from St. Louis, Jefferson city, and Rolla; also from the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad, 20,000 men, and relieve Mulligan. He said that if Price was a soldier, Lexington had then fallen, but he could, with energy, be captured with all his baggage and plunder. The objection that there was no transportation is idle. The railroads and river were at command, and the march from Sedalia was only forty-five miles. The force could, General Hunter supposed, be thrown into Lexington by Thursday, as it appears, before it was taken. General Frémont ordered Sturgis, in North Missouri, to Lexington, and by crossing the river to re-enforce Mulligan. Sturgis had only 1,100 men, and, on reaching the river opposite the town, found it commanded by Price, and, of course, was compelled to fall back. Hunter's plan of moving these troops was to strike the river at a point below Lexington in our control, cross, and march up to the place. In the interview with General Frémont the question was asked whether any orders had been given to re-enforce Mulligan, and the reply being in the negative, General Hunter suggested orders to Sturgis, and had the order then been given by telegraph, he would have reached the river before Price had taken possession of the north bank and could have crossed. The order was not given until three days after the interview. This loss of time was fatal. Mulligan was ordered from Jefferson City, then garrisoned with 5,000 troops, with only one regiment, to hold Lexington until he could be relieved. When Lexington fell, Price had 20,000 men, his force receiving daily augmentation from the disaffected in the State. He was permitted to gather much plunder and fall back towards Arkansas unmolested, until we were at Tipton, the 13th October, when the accounts were that he was crossing the Osage. Frémont's order of march was issued to an army of nearly 40,000, many of the regiments badly equipped, with inadequate supplies of ammunition, clothing and transportation. With what prospect, it must be inquired, can General Frémont, under such circumstances, expect to overtake a retreating army, some one hundred miles ahead, with a deep river between? General Hunter expressed to the Secretary of War his decided opinion that General Frémont was incompetent and unfit for his extensive and important command. This opinion he gave reluctantly, owing to his position as second in command. The opinion entertained by gentlemen who have approached and observed him is, that he is more fond of the pomp than the stern realities of war; that his mind is incapable of fixed attention or strong concentration; that by his mismanagement of affairs since his arrival in Missouri the State has almost been lost, and that, if he is continued in command, the worst results may be anticipated. This is the concurrent testimony of a very large number of the most intelligent men in Missouri. Leaving Tipton on the 13th, we arrived at St. Louis late in the evening, and on the 14th the Secretary of War directed me to issue the following instructions to General Frémont: "ST. LOUIS, MO., October 14, 1861. "GENERAL: The Secretary of War directs me to communicate the following as his instructions for your government: "In view of the heavy sums due, especially in the quartermaster's department in this city, amounting to some $4,500,000, it is important that the money which may now be in the hands of the disbursing officers, or be received by them, be applied to the current expenses of your army in Missouri, and these debts to remain unpaid until they can be properly examined and sent to Washington for settlement; the disbursing officers of the army to disburse the funds and not transfer them to irresponsible agents; in other words, those who do not hold commissions from the President, and are not under bonds. All contracts necessary to be made to be made by the disbursing officers. The senior quartermaster here has been verbally instructed by the secretary as above. "It is deemed unnecessary to erect fieldworks around this city, and you will direct their discontinuance; also those, if any, in course of construction at Jefferson City. In this connexion it is seen that a number of commissions have been given by you. No payments will be made to such officers, except to those whose appointments have been approved by the President. This of course does not apply to the officers with volunteer troops. Colonel Andrews has been verbally so instructed by the Secretary; also, not to make transfers of funds, except for the purpose of paying the troops. "The erection of barracks near your quarters in this city to be at once discontinued. "The Secretary has been informed that the troops of General Lane's command are committing depredations on our friends in western Missouri. Your attention is directed to this, in the expectation that you will apply the corrective. "Major Allen desires the services of Captain Turnley for a short time, and the Secretary hopes you may find it proper to accede thereto. "I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "L. THOMAS, Adjutant General. "Major General J. C. FRÉMONT, "Commanding Department of the West, Tipton, Mo." Instructions were previously given (October 12) to the Hon. James Craig to raise a regiment at St. Joseph, Missouri. We left St. Louis October 14, and arrived at Indianapolis in the evening. I remained at Indianapolis October 15, and conversed freely with Governor Morton. We found that the State of Indiana had come nobly up to the work of suppressing the rebellion. Fifty-five regiments, with several batteries of artillery, had been raised and equipped; a larger number of troops, in proportion to population, than any other State had sent into the field. The best spirit prevailed, and it was manifest that additional troops could easily be raised. The governor had established an arsenal, and furnished all the Indiana troops with full supplies of ammunition, including fixed ammunition for their batteries of artillery. This arsenal was visited, and found to be in full operation. It was under the charge of a competent pyrotechnist. Quite a number of females were employed in making cartridges, and I venture to assert that the ammunition is equal to that which is manufactured anywhere else. Governor Morton stated that his funds for this purpose were exhausted; but the Secretary desired him to continue his operations, informing him that the government would pay for what had been furnished to the troops in the field. It is suggested that an officer of ordnance be sent to Indianapolis to inspect the arsenal and ascertain the amount expended in the manufacture of ammunition, with a view to reimbursing the State. Left Indianapolis October 16 for Louisville, Kentucky, where we arrived at 12 o'clock p. m., and had an interview with General Sherman, commanding the department of the cumberland. He gave a gloomy picture of affairs in Kentucky, stating that the young men were generally secessionists, and had joined the confederates; while the Union men, the aged, and conservatives, would not enrol themselves to engage in conflict with their relations on the other side. But few regiments could be raised. He said that Buckner was in advance of Green river with a heavy force on the road to Louisville, and an attack might be daily expected, which, with the then force, he would not be able to resist, but that he would fight them. He, as well as citizens of the State, said that the border State of Kentucky must furnish the troops to drive the rebels from the State. His force then consisted of 10,000 troops in advance of Louisville, in camp at Nolin river, and on the Louisville and Nashville railroad, at various points; at Camp Dick Robinson, or acting in conjunction with General Thomas, 9,000; and two regiments at Henderson, on the Ohio, at the mouth of Green river.-(See paper No. 14.) On being asked the question, what force he deemed necessary, he promptly replied, 200,000 men. This conversation occurred in the presence |