certainly know in our major cities how vulnerable a population is to the kind of biological or chemical warfare that could be used against a concentrated population.

While we welcome super-power nuclear negotiations, unfortunately, the kinds of terrorist attacks we could face would come from people with whom we do not negotiate.

So, Mr. Revell, I would turn to you to give the opening statement. I would ask each person if they could keep their statement relatively short. We will go from Mr. Revell to Mr. Badolato to Mr. Woloshyn and then to Mr. Alderman, and then open it up to questions of the panel at large.

Mr. Revell.

PANEL CONSISTING OF OLIVER B. REVELL, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; EDWARD V. BADOLATO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENERGY EMERGENCIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; GEORGE WOLOSHYN, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; AND CRAIG ALDERMAN, JR., DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF OLIVER B. REVELL

Mr. REVELL. All right, sir. You have a more complete statement, but I would like to highlight maybe three or four paragraphs, if Í might.

I am pleased to be back again to discuss this issue, the potential of terrorist exploitation of technology, and, more specifically, how the FBI is developing, along with others, plans to deter, contain, react to, and recover from such attacks.

As I pointed out in my previous testimony before this subcommittee on May 19, during the 1980's the United States has not experienced the high levels of terrorist incidents that have occurred in other nations.

In fact, since 1983, there has not been a successful terrorist incident perpetrated in the United States by a member of an international terrorist organization, although-and I would state this and you have seen the material that we have submitted-although there have been several attempts that could have had disastrous results.

It is through the careful collection and analysis of intelligence information, interagency cooperation, and diligent investigation that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies have been able to prevent at least 54 terrorist incidents since 1982.

The prevention of terrorist incidents in the United States is our primary goal. We have had outstanding success in achieving this goal. However, without the ability to collect intelligence as presently allowed by both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Attorney General's guidelines, we will not be able to protect the American public or the international community in the United States from the violent attacks of international terrorists.

What this is, Mr. Chairman, is a statement that in a free and open society you cannot build a fortress; you cannot protect all of the valuable assets of the country by physical security means.

So, we have placed, and I think we will have to continue to place our primary emphasis on trying to prevent the acts of terrorists by the careful collection and analysis of intelligence for preventive purposes.

However, we obviously must plan for the possible consequences of such an act, and therefore we are engaged in a coordinated interagency process to prepare for such contingencies.

The FBI recognizes our continuing responsibility as the lead Federal agency for terrorism in the United States to prepare ourselves and others to deal with the changes in tactics of terrorist groups. We have intensified our efforts in a relatively short period of time to address the issues which we will be discussing today. However, we are keenly aware that much work remains to be done before we are able to effectively counter the high-tech terrorist threat.

The subcommittee can rest assured that we, along with the other agencies represented here today, will continue to work diligently to create effective programs to protect this country from the employment of high-technology weapons or targeting of high-technology resources by modern-day terrorists, and as we prepare to meet this challenge our adherence to prescribed investigative guidelines will ensure compliance with constitutionally-protected privileges.

We certainly cannot create a situation where a rush to react to incidents would put us in the position of undertaking activities that in the long term would be detrimental to our society. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Mr. Revell follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF

OLIVER B. REVELL

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before you to further discuss the issue of potential terrorist exploitation of technology, and more specifically, how the FBI is developing plans to deter, contain, react to, and recover from such attacks. As I pointed out in my previous testimony before this Subcommittee on May 19, 1988, during the 1980s the United States has not experienced the high levels of terrorist incidents that have occurred in other nations of the world. In fact, since 1983, there has not been a successful terrorist incident perpetrated in the United States by a member of an international terrorist organization although there have been several attempts that could have had disastrous results. It is through the careful collection and analysis of intelligence information, interagency cooperation, and diligent investigation that the FBI, and other law enforcement agencies have been able to prevent at least fifty-four terrorist incidents since 1982. The prevention of terrorist incidents in the United States is our primary goal. We have had outstanding success in achieving this goal. However, without the ability to collect intelligence as presently allowed by both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Attorney General Guidelines we will not be able to protect the American public or the international community in the United States from the violent attacks of international terrorists.

In response to additional questions submitted by the Subcommittee subsequent to my last appearance, you have been provided with background information relating to the fifty-four terrorist incidents prevented. As you can see from a review of this data, had these incidents not been detected and interdicted, a substantial number of our citizens and others would have been victims of violent terrorist attacks.

In response to the written questions I have just

mentioned, the Subcommittee has been provided with information

concerning the FBI's 12 Joint Terrorism Task Forces. These Task Forces were formed because we recognized the concurrent

responsibility of the involved agencies. I am convinced that this marshaling of forces has resulted in a more effective use of combined law enforcement resources by eliminating the duplication of investigative efforts. By combining investigative expertise, law enforcement can effectively respond to terrorist threats within the United States. Furthermore, we have found that the cross training of personnel assigned to these task forces has become a potent weapon in our national counterterrorism effort.

This Subcommittee has also been provided with

information concerning the FBI's proposed response capability to chemical and biological terrorism. Although these efforts are for the most part classified, the following information can be provided to the Subcommittee: The FBI's response plan will include a threat assessment component capable of evaluating threat credibility and a multiagency response team utilizing the expertise of the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies in conjunction with state and local agencies. Once the validity of a terrorist threat is established, this highly trained response team would be deployed to the scene of a chemical/biological incident to support law enforcement in the resolution of the crisis. Each of the FBI's 58 field offices will have contingency plans formulated specifically to address a chemical or a biological terrorist crisis. Additionally, we intend to provide specialized training to our Special Agents in Charge and other senior management personnel to ensure that the FBI can quickly and effectively deal with such a crisis.

In addition to the above, the FBI has also established a Nuclear Counterterrorism Program. The goal of this program is to both prevent incidents of nuclear terrorism and to respond effectively should an incident occur. In an effort to prevent such terrorist activity, the FBI cooperates with the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the exchange of intelligence information and in the assessment of potential threats. In the event of an actual nuclear incident, the FBI has contingency plans with every U.S. nuclear

facility. This program is supported by signed Memoranda of Understanding among the FBI and other involved Federal agencies. Another area addressed in the responses to the

Subcommittee's inquiries concerned the development of the FBI's Infrastructure Vulnerability/Key Asset Plan. The FBI's objective in this area is to develop, implement, and maintain a national program which addresses potential and actual acts of terrorism directed against key assets of the infrastructure of the United States. The foundation of this plan rests on the tasking of the FBI's 58 field offices to identify specific key assets, establish liaison with the owners and operators of those assets, and the formulation of contingency plans for those assets aimed at preventing and effectively reacting to a terrorist attack. This program involves cooperative planning with other Government agencies, including the Commander in Chief, United States Forces Command, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Energy; the Committee on Terrorism of the International Association of Chiefs of Police; private industry; and independent research groups.

I am sure that today, as we discuss the scenarios dealing with the shooting down of a commercial airliner; the biological threat to New York City; and the electrical energy threat, that the role of the FBI in preventing and interdicting terrorist incidents which involve the use of high technology will become clearer to the Subcommittee. As I stated in my last appearance before you, we know that our Counterterrorism Program is far better today than it was in the 1970s, and is even stronger than when the program was declared a national priority in 1982.

The FBI recognizes our continuing responsibility as the lead Federal agency for terrorism in the United States to prepare ourselves and others to deal with changes in the tactics of terrorist groups. We have intensified our efforts in a relatively short period of time, to address the issues which we will be discussing today. However, we are keenly aware that much work remains to be done before we are able to effectively counter the high-tech terrorist threat.