levels will drop steadily behind those of the rest of the population, and that each administration will leave the Indians worse off, in relation to the rest of the American people, than it found them.

Adequate funding, therefore, should be a major concern of every Indian program.

During the 1960's, as noted in section III of this study, numerous programs were proposed for every phase of Indian development. They reflected long and expert consideration, and the best of them in each field cannot be improved upon by this study. Some guidelines and suggestions, however, concerning their reevaluation can be proposed at this time, with the added observation that the most realistic proposals and approaches for programs in the future should, and undoubtedly will, originate at the reservation level, and not in Washington.

This study believes that the best and most comprehensive programmatic approach to Indian affairs today is contained in the Report of the Presidential Task Force in 1966, and that its program recommendations should be exhumed and considered.

The principal need of the Indians is jobs, which will break the cycle of poverty and encourage Indian self-confidence. But "the first step in any program concerned with training and employment of Indians," the task force pointed out, was a vastly improved Indian educational system.

The Task Force's educational recommendations, as reiterated in other reports noted in section III of this study, and supported by the reorganization of the Bureau's educational structure as recommended in section V of this study, should be carried out. In addition, the Bureau's Educational Division should establish and fund a Cultural Institute in Alaska, modeled after the Institute of American Indian Arts in Santa Fe, for Native children in Alaska, as recommended by the Indian Arts and Crafts Board to the Secretary of the Interior in 1968.

With regard to economic development, the goal of reservation programs should be the establishment of reservations as viable economic bases for the growth of healthy, self-governing, self-sustaining Indian communities within the body politic of the American Nation.

As a guide for the determination of economic development programs, the Presidential Task Force's proposals under the headings of Employment, Incentives to Attract Industry, the Indian Development Corporation, Planning, and Leadership and Training should be studied. Programs should be developed with the Indians that point the way to vastly increased vocational training; tax credits and other incentives to attract industry; carefully planned and innovative industrial centers on or near reservations that will not create slums and new problems; adequate loan funds to finance tribal enterprise; and the creation of a variety of forms of credit for tribes and individual Indians. An Indian Development Corporation, with functions as proposed by the Presidential Task Force, should be considered as the instrument by which to achieve a maximum number of these goals.

In the meantime, and until long-range programs such as the above begin to have a marked impact on the reservations, a determined

effort must be made to provide training and jobs as quickly as possible for 50,000 unemployed Indians on reservations.

This effort should include adequately financed reservation public works programs in which Indians receive jobs and training on recreational development, homebuilding, road, conservation, and other community improvement projects. Programs, developed at the reservation level, should be designed to put unemployed tribal members to work. The funding should come from increased reservation budgets, or from programs of other Government agencies, or from a combination of both.

The planning and application of all economic development programs, long and short range, should reflect the Indians' own needs, desires and cultural traits. By bringing the Indians into the planning and decisionmaking process, programs need not fail, as they have in the past, because they ignored such factors as the types of industry or activity most attractive to the Indians (i.e., outdoor-oriented enterprise) or tribal cultural traits (i.e., group, rather than competitive, orientation that makes it difficult for some Indians to assume positions in which they must direct, persuade, or give orders to others). Finally, in such fields as health, housing and welfare, the types of programs needed have been blueprinted in the most recent Reports (the Presidential Task Force, the Interagency Task Force, the President's message, etc.) noted in section III of this study. What is required in these fields, above all else, is commitment with adequate funds to bring an end to the long-endured problems.

In conclusion, a long, hard look should be taken at the conflicts that arise between the BIA and the tribes and Indian individuals as a result of the trust functions of the Government. Almost every day, disputes occur between Indians and BIA personnel over leasing, grazing, permits, rights-of-way, wills, use of income, tribal budgets, judgment funds, details of tribal government, approval of attorney contracts, tribal resolutions, ordinances and constitutional amendments. All of these confrontations stem from the large field of responsibilities and obligations given by law to the trustee.

With minor exceptions, the Indians desire the Federal Government to continue to provide its trust protection for their lands, and the Government must continue to give that protection. But it should be possible, by amending the Indian Reorganization Act and other pertinent statutes, to reduce the number of ancillary obligations and responsibilities of the trustee. In their drive for self-determination and selfgovernment, tribes will press increasingly for the right to program their judgment funds, have authority over their budgets, and assume full responsibility for the management of their income, the making of contracts with attorneys, and the framing of tribal codes, resolutions, and constitutional actions. Without abandoning the trusteeship protection of lands, the Government should be in a position to be able to transfer those other responsibilities, piecemeal or in full, to tribes deemed ready to assume them. For some tribes, that day may be already have arrived, and the continued denial to them of rights they are able to exercise for themselves may be viewed as the most stultifying of all the obstacles that inhibit them on their road to development.

I. Who Should Control Indian Education?

A History

Two Case Studies
Recommendations

A REPORT FUNDED BY THE CARNEGIE CORP. AND PREPARED BY FRANCIS MCKINLEY, STEPHEN BAYNE, AND GLEN NIMNICHT (EXCERPT), JUNE 12, 1969

This report was produced by the Far West Laboratory for Educational Research and Development with funds provided by the Carnegie Corp. The laboratory is a nonprofit public organization supported in part by funds from the U.S. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The opinions expressed in this document do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of either the Carnegie Corp. or the Office of Education, and no official endorsement by either organization should be inferred.

The laboratory was established through a joint powers agreement in February 1966. Signatories as of December 31, 1968, include: The regents of the University of California;

The California State Board of Education;

The trustees of the California State colleges;

The county superintendent of schools of the county of Monterey: The board of education of the San Francisco Unified School District;

The regents of the University of Nevada;

The Nevada State Board of Education.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the results of our bibliographic and field investigations of Indian education namely, (a) that present classrooms are poorly adapted to the Indian child, and (b) that it is absolutely necessary that Indian communities be allowed to assume major responsibility for the education of their children, we make the following recommendations to Government agencies, private foundations, and research interests. Government

1. We recommend the creation of a Federal Commission to assume control of Indian education, with an explicit mandate to transfer this control to Indian communities within 5 years, after which the Commission would cease to exist.

The Commission would assume responsibility for the following: (a) expediting the transfer of control over education to Indian communities by providing legal services: (b) training Indian educators to administer and staff the schools; (c) providing consultant assistance to Indian school boards toward establishing and operating a local

school system; (d) providing funds for revising curriculums to reflect the history, culture, and values of the Indian people the school serves; and (e) serving as a conduit for Federal support funds, including Johnson-O'Malley funds.

The documentation which this report gives to a continuing history of paternalistic relationships between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian communities provides a strong rationale for immediate implementation of a program to transfer quickly the control of education from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to Indian communities.

Three models now exist for such a transfer. The first model is the Rough Rock Demonstration School which is operated by Dine, Inc., a Navajo nonprofit organization. The second model is the Blackwater School on the Gila River Pima Indian Reservation in Arizona where an all-Indian school board of education has assumed jurisdiction for a former BIA day school. A more recent model is the Tama Community School which will be operated by the Tama Indian Community beginning with the 1969-70 school year. (The BIA had planned to close this school and to transfer the students to a nearby public school. The Mesquakie Indians of Tama Indian Community protested, and succeeded in getting a court order sustaining the school.)

We would add that the definition of "community" in the transfer process need not be a monolithic one. The Commission could conceivably transfer control to local groups such as Headstart parents advisory committees, tribal councils, or intertribal organizations such as the Arizona Indian Development Association or the California Indian Education Association.

We consider the following factors to be favorable to adoption of the specific method of control transfer which we have recommended above:

The time limit is long enough to insure that the transfer of control will be orderly, and short enough to reassure the Indian people that the change will occur quickly.

The limited life and purpose of the Commission will avoid the problem of replacing one vested interest bureaucracy with another. With adequate support for training administrators, teachers, and school board members, for revising curriculum, and for introducing educational innovations, the Federal Government can transfer the schools to local people in a manner that will greatly enhance the schools' chances for success.

This proposal will not prevent mistakes from being made in the provision of education for Indian children. However, the mistakes will be made by the Indian people themselves, and not by a Federal bureaucracy. Considering that our analysis has shown education for Indians to be largely a failure, we do not feel that the mistakes made by the Indian communities would make the situation any worse than it is now.

2. We recommend that, in the interim until the Commission is initiated, there be an alteration in the criteria used within the Bureau of Indian Affairs for making decisions about promotions and financial rewards.

Rather than rewarding field personnel for accurate reporting and tight administration as is now the general practice, rewards should be granted by the degree to which the recipient has (a) successfully in