occupied areas, and other details which permit a determination that released activity is not likely to return to man in concentrations or quantities exceeding the maximum permissible concentrations for unrestricted areas. This evaluation must take into consideration possible reconcentration in the environs. Consumer products The Commission has taken a conservative approach to permitting the use of radioactive material in consumer products. There have been a number of proposed uses for the manufacture and distribution of devices containing low levels of radioactivity and for the use of radioactive material in process control in a manner in which low residual activity would end up in a product. A few devices such as static eliminators and electron tubes containing very low levels of radioactivity have been licensed for distribution under a general license. These licensing procedures for these devices are similar to those followed for generally licensing thickness gages. The electron tubes contain submicrocurie levels of activity whereas the static eliminators may have up to millicuries of activity. This activity is, however, contained in a sealed source and there is a high degree of built-in safety. The general license is applicable only to devices that are manufactured, tested, and labeled in accordance with specifications contained in a specific license authorizing supply of such devices under general license. Also, the Commission has licensed the addition of radioactive materials for purposes of process or other controls where very low levels of residual activity may end up in the product. In considering any widescale use of radioisotopes for process control, consideration must be given not only to the amount of activity ending up in any one product but also to holding the activity in products in general to an acceptable minimum. The Commission has decided that it is safe to permit very low concentrations of radioisotopes to be used as tracers in process control which may end up as residual activity in the final product. A proposed regulation has been published for public comment to exempt from licensing low concentrations of radioisotopes in products except those designated for ingestion and inhalation by human beings (foods, beverages, cosmetics, and drugs). These low concentrations are based upon the maximum permissible concentrations for continuous exposure for individuals in unrestricted areas. To prevent buildup of activity in the environs and to minimize exposure to the most hazardous radioisotopes, certain long-lived materials (such as strontium 90, cesium 137, and alpha emitters) would not be permitted to be used for such purposes. The Commission will have an opportunity to evaluate each such specific use of radioactive materials since a licensee may not introduce the material into commercial products without a manufacturing license. Waste disposal Under the regulations there are only four ways to dispose of wastes: (1) by burial of small quantities in land, (2) by limited disposal in the sanitary sewer system, (3) by release of effluents in specified low concentrations, or (4) by transfer of the material to another licensee for subsequent disposal. The regulations provide for consideration of alternative methods such as incineration and ocean disposal and for consideration of the disposal of higher levels of wastes on an individual basis. These alternative methods and levels are permitted only upon approval of the Commission of specific applications. Such applications must provide information from which the Commission can make an analysis to determine that the procedure is safe. The levels of activity specified in the regulations are so low as to be considered safe under projected conditions of disposal. In general the levels of radioactive wastes resulting from the use of radioisotopes are low. Only a small percentage of the radioisotopes procured by a licensee ends up as wastes, particularly when the material has a short half life. The problem is usually that of controlling bulk and volume rather than level of activity. Control techniques are relatively simple. Materials must be appropriately packaged and stored for safe transportation and ultimate disposal. Liquid wastes must be packaged to minimize the possibility of leakage or spillage. Procedures for waste control and for protection of personnel in handling and storing of these materials are well known and relatively simple to follow. A special evaluation is made before a licensee is permitted to dispose of radioactive materials by incineration. An applicant for a license to dispose of radioactive waste in the ocean must submit a detailed description of the radioactive material, including the quantities and kinds of material and the proposed manner and condition of disposal. The applicant must also include detailed information on container and packaging specification, packaging and storage area, transportation facilities, instrumentation for measurement of radiation levels and contamination, radiation safety procedures to be followed in collecting, storing, packaging, and transporting the material; emergency procedures; site location of disposal, including depth of water at proposed location and records of disposal which are to be maintained. A prelicensing visit is usually made to the applicant prior to issuing such a license. During this visit a careful review is made with the applicant of the proposed program to determine that it can be conducted in accordance with the regulations and any special terms or conditions as may be added to the license. A firsthand evaluation is made of the site for packaging and storage of radioactive waste. Eight concerns are now licensed to offer a commercial waste disposal service. These concerns are located on the east and the west coasts. They are disposing of their materials either by shipment to the Commission for disposal in its burial grounds or by disposal in the ocean. The possession limit for these licensees varies from 1 curie to 1,000 curies; but, in general, the total material possessed at any one time is much lower than the possession limit. Source materials In the processing mills, uranium ore is converted to uranium metal oxides and fluorides. Because of the low level of radiation emitted by uranium, external exposure presents practically no problem. In the milling process, however, considerable dust is created during the crushing process which presents an internal hazard unless properly controlled. The dust is not highly radioactive and does not present a problem outside the mill. The dust hazard may be controlled by enclosing operations creating dust, by utilizing ventilation procedures, and by providing personnel with respiratory protective devices. Mill effluents containing uranium and radium must be properly controlled to prevent contamination of streams or the creation of environmental hazards. Control may be exercised by proper monitoring procedures to control levels of activities discharged and by the use of hold-up ponds and storage areas. Inspection of the mills and studies by the Commission and other Federal and State agencies indicated that there are problems concerning dust concentrations in the mills and there may also be problems presented by discharge of mill effluents. Products of the uranium mill to be used as reactor fuel are sent to the Commission's facilities for enrichment by the gaseous diffusion process or for processing otherwise. Some of the materials from the mills are made available to the licensees. Materials procured by licensees may be used for both nuclear and nonnuclear purposes. Some of these uses are: (a) Chemical reagents. (b) Calibration sources. 6. Medical aids. Nuclear use: 1. Subcritical assemblies about 2,500 kilograms uranium, aluminum-clad, used essentially in universities under RD grant. 2. Research and development. (a) Basic research. (b) Fuel element development. In manufacturing and fabrication of products containing source material there is a potential dust hazard which is generally controlled through "wet operation" procedures and proper ventilation. When these materials are used in liquid form as for spraying on glazes, operations should be performed in hoods and operators may need to wear respirators for protection against air suspended mists. External exposure is controlled by well known methods. SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL The principal licensed licensed uses of special nuclear material are : (1) Fuel element fabrication. (2) Processing of unirradiated special nuclear material (3) Scrap recovery. (4) Neutron and alpha sources. (5) Analysis, testing and monitoring. (6) Instrumentation. (a) Fission chamber manufacturers. (7) Gamma irradiation. (8) Research. (a) Commercial. (b) Educational institutions. The hazards associated with the use of special nuclear materials are substantially greater than those associated with source materials with respect to control from both internal and external exposure. Uranium 223, and plutonium present a potentially significant internal hazard. However, the principal hazard unique to special nuclear material is the possible accumulation of sufficient quantities to create a critical mass. In chemical processing of scrap recovery operations accidental criticality is prevented by the observance of operational methods and procedures to prevent the accumulation of a critical mass during the processing and storage of the material. This involves the design of proper conduits and containers to provide geometric arrangements which will minimize the possibility of criticality and batch and other methods are used to keep masses segregated. These procedures must be supplemented by appropriate monitoring and warning systems. Fuel elements which have been used in a reactor are highly radioactive from the large quantities of fission products produced and require elaborate remote handling facilities and detailed operating procedures to assure safety. NUCLEAR REACTORS The Commission has heretofore presented detailed reports and testimony to the committee concerning its procedures and requirements for licensing nuclear reactors. This portion of the statement is, accordingly, designed merely to identify the general nature of the radiation hazards associated with nuclear reactor operation, and the general nature of the Commission's major research programs directly related to reactor safety. In the typical nuclear reactor, radioactive fission products are generally of the order of 10 curies of radioactivity for each watt of rated thermal power. Thus, in large reactors in the inventory of radioactive material in the accumulated fission products constitutes the largest quantities of gross radioactive activity outside the Commission's burial grounds for fission products. Radioactive effluents may be discharged from routine operation of reactors, but the quantities and concentrations involved are low and carefully controlled. The major potential hazard presented by nuclear reactor operation is from the remote, but not impossible, catastrophe which might cause release into the environment of a part of the fission product inventory within the reactor. The Commission's procedures and requirements respecting the licensing of nuclear reactors are designed to assure appropriate protection both with respect to normal operation and the remote possibility of an accidental release. To carry out these reviews, the Commission has a reactor hazards evaluation staff including reactor physicists; nuclear, mechanical, electrical, and chemical engineers; experts in heat transfer and thermal phenomena; and experts on pressure vessels, boilers and piping codes, sanitary engineering and waste disposal. The assistance of other Federal agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard, the Weather Bureau, and the U.S. Geodetic and Geological Survey are frequently obtained. The views of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe guards are obtained with respect to all applications for power and test reactors and in such other cases as the nature of the safety problems warrant. Major research programs relating to nuclear reactor safety are being carried out, including those pertaining to fission product release from melted fuel elements; factors affecting water-metal reactions; theoretical studies of reactor dynamics; initiation and penetration of missiles inside of reactor containment vessels; experimental studies on pressure vessels; experimental investigation on scale models of reactor containment vessels; meteorological dispersal of radioactive materials; and factors in harbors relating to dispersal and dilution of radioactive contaminants. Experimental investigations on reactor transients and dynamic behavior include SPERT, Borax, KEWB, TREAT, and EBR I. Investigations of fast reactor characteristics include the EBR I, EBR II, and ZPR experiments. TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS Spe All of the radioactive materials which we have previously discussed must be transported about the country. This includes thousands of routine shipments of radioisotopes, and the shipment of source and special nuclear materials. cial nuclear materials are shipped in the form of fuel elements and uranium compounds. Spent fuel elements which have been used in reactors for long periods of time and which contain hundreds of thousands of curies of fission products present special problems. Safety in transportation is largely dependent upon the proper design of shipping containers to assure that external radiation levels are kept within safe limits and that containers are designed and constructed so that they are not likely to rupture and release the radioactive contents. Potential hazards of criticality in shipping special nuclear materials is controlled by limiting the quantity of material placed in one container and designing containers so as to maintain safe distances between indivdual containers and thereby prevent the interaction of materials in different containers. Limits are also placed on the number of containers which can be placed in a boxcar or truck. In shipping irradiated fuel elements, the number of elements in a single container must be limited and the container must be designed in such a way as to prevent criticality under credible conditions of shipment. The containers must be designed and the number of elements limited to insure that heat generated from the intense radioactivity of the fission products is properly dissipated to the outside of the container to prevent the container from melting or rupturing and thereby releasing the fission products. The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Coast Guard and the Federal Aviation Administration have regulations which cover most routine shipments of radioisotopes and source material. Shipments of special nuclear material (including irradiated fuel elements) must also meet AEC requirements to protect against the special hazards involved in such shipments. ENFORCEMENT Reports of inspections of licensee's activities are evaluated to determine the status of compliance of the licensees with AEC regulations. If it appears that a licensee may be in noncompliance with requirements of his license and the Commission's regulations, a notice of alleged violation is issued. The notice calls the facts to the licensee's attention, requests a written explanation and requests prompt submission of a statement of the corrective steps to be taken. If the reply does not satisfactorily explain the noncompliance and assure that further violations will be prevented, the Commission may issue an order to show cause why the license should not be terminated or otherwise modified. In instances where the protection of the public health and safety requires immediate modification of a licensee's practices, or the alleged noncompliance is willful, the Commission's rules permit the Commission to issue orders requiring immediate corrective action or suspension of operations. COOPERATION WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES In the administration of its regulatory program, the Commission cooperates with a number of Federal agencies. The Commission cooperates with the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Post Office Department in matters pertaining to the regulation of the transportation of radioactive materials. Currently, the Commission is participating on a committee in the review and revision of the transportation regulations of these agencies which relate to radioactive materials. The Commission also works closely with the Bureau of Customs in matters involving the export or import of Commission regulated materials. Technical advice is furnished also with regard to specific shipments. The Commission cooperates closely with the U.S. Public Health Service and the Department of Labor as to matters of common interest in the field of radiation protection. Their views are solicited on regulations relating to radiation protection and they are kept apprised of our training and assistance programs. The Commission is also cooperating with the Public Health Service in environmental and pollution studies with respect to the uranium mills. The Commission also receives technical assistance from a number of Federal agencies with regard to reactor sites, as for example, the U.S. Weather Bureau, U.S. Geological Survey, the Maritime Commission, and the U.S. Public Health Service. COOPERATION WITH STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES Early in the radioisotope distribution program, the Commission recognized the interest of the several States in the public health and safety aspects of its regulatory program. Technical information on radiation protection was made available to the States covering such subjects as shielding, radiation surveying, and monitoring methods and procedures, laboratory design, waste disposal, etc. Upon request, States were supplied names of radioisotope users. Beginning in 1949, States were routinely supplied lists of all radioisotope users and efforts were expanded to keep them apprised of our regulatory activities. In 1950, a cooperative visitation program was initiated on a broad scale. State personnel were routinely invited to accompany Commission personnel on visits to radioisotope users and the program was coordinated to maximize mutual assistance. Through this cooperative program, States have been kept informed of the development in our evolving regulatory program. By such orientation, State officials have been kept aware of our basic approach in evaluating and controlling radiation hazards. The areas of coordination continued to expand following passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Soon after its licensing program was initiated, pursuant to the act, the Commission began sending copies of byproduct material licenses to State officials. Similarly, copies of licenses for source and special nuclear materials and nuclear facilities were supplied to the States. Copies of licenses are now sent to the States on a daily basis. In addition, States are notified when license applications are received and licenses issued for reactors and for commercial waste disposal services. The Commission has worked closely with the Council of State Governments, as for example, in the preparation of the Coordination of Atomic Development Act which has been recommended by the Council as desirable State legislation. The Commission has also maintained close liaison with various State and regional groups, such as the New England and Southern Regional Advisory Committees on Atomic Energy. The Commission has, upon request, assisted States by review of proposed regulations and legislation, and AEC staff members have participated in State hearings on matters affecting such proposals. The Commission has entered into an agreement with the American Municipal Association to study the impact of peaceful application of atomic energy on local government. This study is expected to provide guidance in the future for extension of the Commission's cooperative program at the local level of government. Chairman ANDERSON. Thank you. Mr. GRAHAM. You have been very kind, sir, in giving us a lot of time. Chairman ANDERSON. Do you have some comments to make, Mr. Nelson? Mr. GRAHAM. Do you care to make any comments at all or would you just like to file a statement for the record? Mr. NELSON. It depends entirely on the timing. I have highlighted this to about 15 minutes, Senator, maybe 20. Chairman ANDERSON. Will you proceed, please? |