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Representative HOLIFIELD. I might say that I am not sustaining the doubling of the dose because I do not have the scientific competence to say whether the first dose was right or the second dose. But as far as us taking a position, it is nothing new in the scientific world to change positions. I think in these hearings we have had a great many scientific positions changed, and I point out to you, for instance, that our scientific position on the detection of bombs was very drastically changed. I have no way of judging personally whether it was done for political reasons or for scientific reasons. But a galaxy of scientists appeared before us and said it was for scientific reasons.

Mr. GOODMAN. They were agreeing with the official position, many

of them.

Representative HOLIFIELD. You may impute to every witness that appears before this committee some very devious position, if you wish. That is within your right. I make my own judgment on each witness' testimony, but not on the basis of assertions of other witnesses that they are doing it for devious reasons.

Mr. GOODMAN. I raise the question as to the role of the United States delegates in the ICRP. In this connection I would like to quote from a statement of Lauriston Taylor as published in the Journal of Health, Physics Society, for September 15, 1958, in an article entitled, "History of the International Commission on Radiological Protection," page 99. He reports that in the process of trying to reach an area of agreement, apparently, in regard to the setting of a standard, on probably the most vital single sensitive exposure in this whole health problem, the proposals of the United Kingdom of an average per capita gonadal dose of 3 roentgens to 20 roentgens, the proposal of the United States. I don't know by which method the U.S. delegates arrived at a figure 7 times that arrived at by the scientists of the United Kingdom.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Do you know by what method the United Kingdom arrived at theirs?

Mr. GOODMAN. No.

Representative HOLIFIELD. I don't either.

Mr. GOODMAN. But it does seem to me

Representative HOLIFIELD. But you accept one and reject the other. I don't accept either one of them.

Mr. GOODMAN. I have not even been able to complete the sentence. Representative HOLIFIELD. I don't believe either one to be scientifically established fact.

Mr. GOODMAN. I have not been able to complete the sentence, so I am not sure you can know what I accept. I do know that I resent the phrasing that Mr. Taylor reports here. He says a middle value of 10 r was informally accepted. It seems to me that is not the basis upon which the most important single radiation exposure in the world level should be set.

Representative HOLIFIELD. My friend, when you realize that you are dealing in an area where it is not susceptible to scientific proof, then there comes a time when reasonable men arrive at a compromise. The compromise may be wrong or it may be right. The 20 might have been right or the 3 might have been right. But where there is a diversity of opinion in a field that is unexplored and where the facts cannot be ascertained, it is usually a scientific habit to arrive at what they call a factor of degree. This apparently is what hap

pened there. I would accuse those who deserted their position of 3 of the same cupidity and the same degree of deviousness as those who deserted the level of 20. If you are going to accuse any of them of being devious, that is. Can't we give both sides the credit of being honest and being concerned and yet not being able to prove their point, and thereby arriving at a compromise? I think this frequently happens in the negotiation of wages, does it not, between the employee and employer?

Mr. GOODMAN. Yes, but at least we have representation at that level. Representative HOLIFIELD. You mean to say that the 100 or more U.S. citizens that are in the NCRP-perhaps it is 150—that there is no representation there of scientific viewpoint?

Mr. GOODMAN. I would like if I may

Representative HOLIFIELD. Or would you like to have a labor representative who has had no training in physics go on that board?

Mr. GOODMAN. I would like to insert in the record, if I may, at this point, an evaluation of the competency of the NCRP by Jack Schubert and Ralph Lapp.

Representative HOLIFIELD. I am sure that will be accepted. (The information referred to follows:)

[From Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. XIV, No. 1, January 1958]

(By Jack Schubert and Ralph E. Lapp)

Consider the membership of the influential U.S. National Committee on Radiation Protection (NCRP): Of the 36 members, nearly one-half are physicians, eight representing radiological groups and the other representing the military and industry; while nearly all the rest are physicists, with a few representing manufacturers of radiation equipment. Essentially, no "pure" scientists representing such fields as cellular physiology, biochemistry, genetics, trace element metabolism, and biostatistics are on the committee. The NCRP, being the principal committee concerned with all aspects of radiation, should represent a wide spectrum of scientific fields-one made up of all geneticists, for example, is no more qualified than a committee consisting only of physicians, or statisticians. One of the underlying reasons why the recommendations of the report of the National Academy of Sciences (1956) clashed with NCRP views is probably the different membership of the advisory committees involved.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Mr. Schubert was invited to come before the committee and testify on bomb-test radiation, and he came before the committee and presented a paper on the effect of X-ray radiation of an intensity of from 2 to 5 roentgens on the fetus in a pregnant woman. As chairman of the committee, I permitted him to go ahead and present his full paper, although it was not a paper on the subject of the hearing. It did make more sensational copy than if he had testified on the 0.7 of a roentgen over 14 years of accumulation of bomb-test fallout. So we will be glad to have more of that. We hope this particular matter that you are submitting is pertinent to the record.

Mr. GOODMAN. In the committee record dated May 4, 1959, there is a statement by Maurice Visscher on the shortcomings of this change of body burden standards which our letter relates to.

You have just had a witness here representing the study group of the Michigan Law School at Ann Arbor. This gentleman discussed the inability of States to participate fully. I concur. Yet it was interesting to me that he was the very official for the Commission who froze out from representation in the Sandusky matter (NACA

Docket 50-30, p. 26) which I have referred to at a number of hearings this year, the position of the State regarding the lack of safety in that case.

Representative HOLIFIELD. What do you mean by the words "froze out"? What was his position? We he working for the Commission at the time?

Mr. GOODMAN. He was an attorney for the Commission, both in the Detroit Edison case over a period of 2 years, and he was the attorney for the so-called separated staff of the Commission in the matter relating to the Sandusky case.

Representative HOLIFIELD. What was his name?

Mr. GOODMAN. His name was Lee Hydeman. I would like to insert in the record, if I may, at this point the exchange between Mr. Hydeman and Dr. Dwork of the State of Ohio when Dr. Dwork attempted on behalf of the State of Ohio to object to the granting of a license to the Sandusky reactor.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Is this pertinent matter to our discussion

today?

Mr. GOODMAN. Yes, of course. It relates directly, sir, to whether or not the States participate and can participate in the making of decisions. You recall that Mr. Berman and Mr. Hydeman made a recommendation to you that the sole decision regarding the location of a reactor should be up to the AEC, and that the States have not been able to participate because of a lack of competence. I think that comes with lack of grace from a man who participated in the Commission policies to prevent the States from participating when they sought to as they did in the Sandusky case.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From NACA hearing Jan. 16, 1958]

Mr. HYDEMAN. May I ask one question?

Dr. Dwork, from the State of Ohio rendered an appearance. Was this in the nature of a limited appearance under the Commission's rules of practice? Dr. DwORK. Being a physician, I am not sure I can legally interpret that at all. PRESIDING OFFICER. Why don't you come up here so you can see this Mickey Mouse picture we are going to have in a minute or two. We will be glad to have you. Bring up your papers.

Dr. DWORK. What I have to say I won't need any papers.

PRESIDING OFFICER. All right, sir.

Mr. HYDEMAN. I thought you might want to make some remarks in connection with the proceeding.

Dr. DWORK. I do.

PRESIDING OFFICER. We will permit the remarks under limited appearance, if that is agreeable to counsel.

Mr. DEMBLING. Yes.

Mr. HYDEMAN. Yes.

PRESIDING OFFICER. I think that is probably what you want to do.

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PRESIDING OFFICER. Why don't we proceed and let Mr. Dembling put in his direct case, and we will hear from you before we conclude.

Anything further in the way of preliminary matters?

Mr. HYDEMAN. No, Mr. Examiner.

Mr. DEMBLING. I was going to suggest, Mr. Examiner, that perhaps Dr. Dwork make his statement at the present time so that in our case-in-chief if he brings up any questions that might be covered, we could cover them right at the same time; if that is agreeable to the parties.

Mr. HYDEMAN. If that is agreeable to Dr. Dwork I have no objection.
PRESIDING OFFICER. Very well. I will be glad to hear you, Dr. Dwork.

42561 0-59-29

Dr. DWORK. First, let me identify myself. I am Dr. Dwork, director of health in the State of Ohio. This is the first such appearance that I have made, although we have other installations in the State.

We, I would like to say, are anxious and desirous of having this installation in the State of Ohio. We feel that the presence of such an installation will create, if nothing else, a milieu for other installations which we think is going to be the growing field.

We would like to see a nucleus of people who have know-how from which others can draw on for information, consultation, and advice.

We think that this is important to the total growth of the State. I want to establish that first, that we are anxious and desirous of having that installation. As director of health, however, my concern is with the health of the people of Ohio. This is set by law.

We do not in our department have people who are competent, we believe, in either the building or the operation of reactors and their evaluation. It is therefore, necessary for us whenever possible, where our knowledge is lacking to consult the Public Health Service for such additional information as we would require.

Our position here, Mr. Examiner, is briefly this: In reviewing what material we have, the review made by the Committee on Reactor Safeguards indicates that there is some misgivings on their part with regard to both the site and what is going to be done at that site.

If this committee of the AEC had some misgivings, our position is such that naturally, we must have some misgivings.

It would be my feeling that although we are keenly desirous of having this facility in Ohio, that until such time as there is ample assurance which is acceptable to the Committee on Reactor Safeguards, an operational license be delayed.

That, basically, is our position, Sir.

PRESIDING OFFICER. Thank you, Dr. Dwork. I am sure the Commission appreciates having the position of the State of Ohio in this matter.

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Mr. GOODMAN. That raises the whole question which I referred to, and which I feel is essentially important. This is with regard to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. I might say they submitted a report, and you had a hearing on the matter, though I did not see that there was any reference or any discussion to the cases which we raised. I think the action of the States is fundamentally important to this matter, because there have been efforts by the States to participate. There have been efforts by the States to inform themselves. There are in the record a number of cases where it has been made impossible by the AEC for the State to even get copies of reports, the exchange between yourself and the Governor of Michigan in regard to the Detroit Edison case which was recently the subject of some discussion in another committee. This ACRS committee in my opinion needs strengthening at the Federal level. It needs to be made independent. I used the word "pressure" in my last appearance, and I think that only if its position is strengthened can it be protected from unnecessary and undue pressure.

I would like to call the committee's attention to a section of their report to you which was used for your indemnity and advisory committee on reactor safeguards hearings on page 55. There is another one of the reports of the committee to the Commission, and the subject of this one is the Lockheed radiation effects reactor. The final paragraph of that reads, and I submit in relation to my previous charges of the use of "pressure":

If the additional risks entailed in operating a reactor at substantial power in an unshielded position are compensated by the prospect of getting important information that cannot be obtained by safer methods than in the present instance, these additional risks may be considered acceptable. Within the limited knowledge of radiation damage effects, the committee is doubtful that the bene

fits of irradiating large scale aircraft components will compensate the additional risks of doing so by the proposed methods, but is willing to defer to superior judgment in this regard.

"Deferring to superior" judgment is an example of what I meant to you earlier in the pressures which were being brought to permit the construction of reactors which in the judgment of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards are unsafe.

Representative HOLIFIELD. At this time may I direct the staff to direct a letter on that so that we can do the Committee on Reactor Safeguards justice, and ask for an explanation on that particular statement so that it can be placed in the record at this point? (The letters referred to follow :)

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS,

Mr. JAMES T. RAMEY,

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., June 26, 1959.

Executive Director,

Congress of the United States,

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. RAMEY: This is in reply to your letter of June 19, 1959, regarding a letter from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards of August 5, 1958, on the Lockheed radiation effects reactor.

In the August 5, 1958, letter the ACRS expressed its views of the safety of the design and operation of this unshielded and uncontained reactor. In the last paragraph of this letter the committee pointed out that it was not judging the value of the military testing program. The phrase, "to defer to superior judgment" relates to this radiation effects testing program and not to the safety of the proposed operation. The committee recognizes its responsibility to give advice on safety and as a policy does not advise on program matters.

Sincerely yours,

C. ROGERS MCCULLOUGH, Chairman.

Dr. C. ROGERS MCCULLOUGH,

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY,
Washington, D.C., June 19, 1959.

Chairman, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C.

DEAR DR. MCCULLOUGH: During the hearings before the Joint Committee on Federal-State Relationships on May 22, 1959, Mr. Leo Goodman testified concerning the letter of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards dated August 5, 1958, on the Lockheed radiation effects reactor. This letter appears at pages 55 and 56 of the Joint Committee print entitled "AEC Report on Indemnity Act and Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards" (April 1959), a copy of which is enclosed for your information. Mr. Goodman's testimony on this point appears at pages 675-676 of the transcript of the May 22 hearings.

At the conclusion of Mr. Goodman's remarks, Congressman Holifield stated that he would direct the staff to send a letter to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and ask for an explanation of the final paragraph in the August 5, 1958, letter. (Transcript, p. 676.)

Pursuant to previous discussions with the staff of the Joint Committee, it is requested that the Advisory Committee submit as soon as possible any statement it wishes to make concerning its August 5, 1958, letter or Mr. Goodman's testimony, for insertion in the record of the May 22, 1959, hearings.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES T. RAMEY, Executive Director.

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