so it has been held in some states that since the courts have the sole power to prescribe for themselves the qualifications of their own officers, and the rules and regulations for their admission, interference by a coordinate branch of the government, viz, the legislature, will not be tolerated. (In re Day (1899) 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 5 L. R. A. 519-statute permitting anyone who has passed a two-year course of study to practice law, held unconstitutional; In re Branch (1904) 70 N. J. Law 537, 57 Atl. 431; Splane's Petition (1889) 123 Pa. 527, 16 Atl. 481; In re Pletz (1913) 42 Utah, 439, 132 Pac. 390.)

The majority rule permits reasonable regulation by the legislature. Since by the majority rule the practice of law is a privilege created by statute, and not to be claimed as a matter of right, it is conceded by these courts in order to avoid possible friction that the legislature may by virtue of its police power prescribe reasonable regulations, just as it may prescribe the qualifications for the pursuit of the ordinary vocations of life (cases collected 6 C. J. 572). The creation by statute of a Board of Bar Examiners has been held valid by many courts as an efficient aid in the better discharge of a burdensome task. (In re Frank (1920) 293 Ill. 263, 127 N. E. 640; In re Alexander (1911) 167 Mich. 495, 133 N. W. 491; In re New York Law School (1907) 190 N. Y. 215, 83 N. E. 17; In re Bowers (1917) 138 Tenn. 662, 200 S. W. 821.)

California has from an early date followed the majority rule. In Cohen v. Wright, supra, it was first held that the courts would permit reasonable regulation by the legislature as to qualifications and requirements for admission to the bar. (In re Collins (1922) 188 Cal. 701, 206 Pac. 990, 32 A. L. R. 1062; Clark v. Willits, supra, accord.) In In re Chappelle (Feb. 2, 1925) 46 Cal. App. Dec. 383, Pac. the District Court of Appeal refused to admit the petitioner to practice law, where he had not been examined by the Board of Bar Examiners, upholding the constitutionality of the Board created by section 276a of the Code of Civil Procedure (1919). This case falls in line with other decisions of our courts showing a marked willingness to receive assistance in this work from bodies created by the legislature. Quere: Whether in view of section 276 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires that before being admitted to practice law, the applicant must produce a certificate showing that he has satisfactorily passed an examination conducted by the Board of Bar Examiners, the District Court of Appeal has the power to admit to the bar one who has not been given such a certificate.

WITNESSES: PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PLAINTIFF AND PROSECUTING WITNESS: X-RAY-In the case of Lawrence v. Pickwick Stages (Aug. 30, 1924) 45 Cal. App. Dec. 80, 229 Pac. 885, the court granted a motion compelling the plaintiff, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries, to submit to a physical examination, but refused an order compelling him to submit to an x-ray of the injured parts of his body when the defendant refused to give a bond indemnifying the plaintiff against any injuries which might result from that examination.

When will a court compel a witness to submit to a physical examination? Where he is the plaintiff in an action, the typical case being that of the complainant in a suit for personal injuries, a majority of the courts will grant the order. (Johnston v. S. P. Co. (1907) 150 Cal. 535, 98 Pac. 348; Chamber

layne, Modern Law of Evidence, § 3597; Jones on Evidence (3d ed.) §§ 396, 397; Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) §§ 2194, 2216c, 2220; 17 C. J. 1052; see also, Melone v. Sierra R. Co. (1907) 151 Cal. 113, 91 Pac. 522; Anderson v. United Stages (1923) 41 Cal. App. Dec. 659, reversed in Anderson v. United Stages (1923) 192 Cal. 250, 219 Pac. 748, on the ground that although the court may issue an order enabling the defendant to obtain the evidence necessary to his defense, and thus require the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination, it was not required to obtain and produce evidence of the physical condition of the plaintiff by making the physician, who was to conduct the examination, the witness of the court, and not of the defendant; Hayt v. Brewster, etc. Co. (1921) 199 App. Div. 68, 191 N. Y. Supp. 176, ordering a blood test of the plaintiff; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 128 (5).) There are several jurisdictions which follow the minority rule and refuse to compel any witness to submit to a physical examination. (Union P. R. Co. v. Botsford (1891) 141 U. S. 250, 35 L. Ed. 734, 11 Sup Ct. Rep. 1000; 16 A. & E. Encycl. of Law (2d ed.) 810; 17 C. J. 1053.) Where the witness is not a party plaintiff some courts still will compel a submission, although the cases are almost exclusively confined to those where the person to be examined is the prosecuting witness in a criminal action for rape. (People v. Preston (1912) 19 Cal. App. 675, 685, 127 Pac. 660 (dictum); State v. Pucca (1902) 14 Del. 71, 55 Atl. 831; Walker v. State (1915) 12 Okla. Cr. 179, 153 Pac. 209; Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) §§ 2216c, 2220.) Other courts refuse to extend the doctrine on the ground that the basis of the power to compel a plaintiff to submit to a physical examination, is the authority of the court to refuse to entertain the action further unless he consents thereto, and as the court has not this authority over other witnesses the rule cannot be extended so as to apply to them. (Thomas v. Commonwealth (1920) 188 Ky. 509, 222 S. W. 951; Goodwin v. State (1902) 114 Wis. 318, 90 N. W. 170.) This reason would be all the more pertinent where the witness had no material connection with the action whatever, and in a very singular case where these facts were presented the court refused to grant the order. (McKnight v. Detroit, etc. Co. (1904) 135 Mich. 307, 97 N. W. 772.)

Even in those cases where the examination is allowed there arises the further question, raised by the instant case, as to whether the court will order the particular form of physical examination the defendant requests. (15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 663.) This is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, as is the granting of any order for a physical examination. In the x-ray cases the chief considerations have been whether the particular case so urgently demanded the disclosure of more certain facts as to require the application of this very precise method, and whether the particular method could be used without injury to the plaintiff's life or health, or the infliction of pain upon him.

With these considerations in mind, because of the danger involved, the early decisions refused to order an x-ray. (Lasker v. S. Bolton's Sons (1914) 161 App. Div. 181, 146 N. Y. Supp. 321; Gregory v. Acme Road Mach. Co. (1916) 175 App. Div. 473, 162 N. Y. Supp. 574; State v. Call (1912) 64 Fla. 144, 59 So. 789; Wittenberg v. Onsgard (1899) 78 Minn. 342, 81 N. W. 14; Dean v. Wabash R. R. (1910) 229 Mo. 425, 129 S. W. 953.) Later cases, recognizing the safety and the advanced condition of this branch of medical science, granted the order. (U. S. Fidelity, etc. Co. v. Wickline (1918) 103 Neb. 21, 170 N. W. 193; Hollister v. Robertson (1924) 207 App. Div. 71, 203

N. Y. Supp. 514.) The theory of all the decisions indicates that a determination whether any given court will order an x-ray is dependent upon whether that court has or has not taken judicial notice of the safety of the x-ray. But it should be kept in mind that the request in every case must comply with the rules which govern the application for any order for a physical examination. (U. S. Fidelity, etc. Co. v. Wickline, supra; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Bartek (1915) 177 S. W. 137 (Tex. Civ. App.); 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 663; Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence, § 3599; Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) § 2220 (B. 6).)

By requiring a bond, before ordering the plaintiff to submit to the x-ray examination, did not the California court abuse its discretion? Had it feared the examination might injure the plaintiff, was not the proper procedure to refuse any order which might subject him to such a hazard, bond or no bond? If the court has taken judicial notice of the safety of the x-ray, did it not deprive the defendant of relief to which he was entitled, and abuse its discretion by requiring him to advance a bond before ordering an examination? A possible procedure, to overcome these objections, would be to have the witness consult his physician as to the advisability of an x-ray, and if the latter did not advise against it the witness would have no grounds for complaint. The advantage of this procedure is that the courts would more readily arrive at a judicial determination of the safety of the x-ray, as few doctors, most of whom constantly and frequently use the x-ray, would advise against its application.

At any rate, the California decision must not be considered as laying down a definite rule that every time a defendant moves the court to order a witness to subject himself to an x-ray he must accompany such motion with a bond, or that motion will be denied. When the California court, like the New York and Nebraska courts, takes judicial notice of the safety and advanced state of the science of x-ray examinations no bond will be required.

Book Reviews

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT. By Mary Beard. New York, N. Y.: George A. Doran Company. 1924. vi and 206 pp.

Mary Beard's slender and unassuming book "is intended as a brief and simple story of the labor movement in the United States from the day of independence to the present time." The result achieved is just what was intended; the book neither falls below nor rises above that objective.

This history is one of a group of titles being published as a "Worker's Bookshelf" to give to the laborer an opportunity to understand better some of the complexities of the industrial world in which he moves. The author has made the contents of the book consonant with its purpose by a facile approach and a simplicity of style which enhances rather than restricts its interest for the general reader.

The labor movement in America as traced by Mrs. Beard from

its inception in colonial times is a story of a struggle for a better existence that has not yet completely subsided although in recent years much of its old ferocity has gone because the needs of the working man have been met to a large extent through legislation and sympathetic public opinion. This was only accomplished, however, after many disheartening defeats. Time after time unions and national federations were formed for the general welfare of the employed only to meet defeat at the hands of antagonistic politicians or to be swept away in times of financial depression.

Real progress toward industrial peace came when previous imperfect organizations were replaced by the American Federation of Labor and the late Samuel Gompers was made its first president in 1886, a post which he held with the exception of one year down to the time of his death. Mr. Gompers refused to permit lofty utopian ideals to interfere with the immediate business of obtaining tangible results and gradually labor was placed on a firm foundation and was given recognition by the federal government when it established the Department of Labor and its secretary was given a place in the president's cabinet. Thus the author presents an interesting tale of evolution. A growth from impotent guilds making weak gestures towards organization to a powerful force that compels recognition in every national issue.

E. C. Raffetto.

CHILD LABOR AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Raymond G. Fuller. New York, N. Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1923. xvi and 323 PP.

This book is a very timely and very full discussion of the existence of child labor in all parts of the United States, and in all of its phases, rural child labor (pp. 32-74), urban and industrial child labor (pp. 75-123), child labor and the schools (pp. 124-194), all based upon statistics, reports and surveys, with a sane critical study of this accumulation of data and the formulation of conclusions therefrom. No person who really wants to speak right or vote right on the proposed child-labor amendment to the federal constitution should neglect this book. Many persons, of course, are content with off-hand conclusions based upon casual observation and also there are many who hold doctrinaire tenets about divisions of power between the state and central governments, and deduce their opposition to the proposed amendment abstractly from these tenets. Lawyers are likely to be found approaching the proposal from this abstract point of view. To them especially is this book recommended by the reviewer.

A summary of existing state legislation on child labor is given in Chapter V (pp. 194-235), entitled Laws and Legislative Standards; and finally in Chapter VI the author devotes fifty pages to the Problem of Federal Action. Supplementarily there is a brief chapter devoted to international movements for the restriction of child labor, including the drafts for conventions on the subject drawn up by the conferences of the International Labor Organizations, and the extent to which these conventions have been ratified by various nations.

The author touches upon the possibility of national control of child labor by treaty after the fashion of the Migratory Bird Treaty with Canada and federal legislation in enforcement of it, but deprecates resort to this questioned mode of asserting federal power. "A policy of legislation by treaty is inadvisable, and there should be no semblance of overriding state rights, as there would not be if federal authority in the field of labor legislation were granted and clearly defined in the constitution."

The key to the motives of the proponents of the proposed amendment, the author thus expresses:-"That which the most enlightened parent wishes for his own children, he and every citizen should wish for all the children of the nation." The effort that opponents are making to have it appear that parents are crying out against interference with parental control of children reminds us that government already has ample power to force the betterment of children upon unwilling or ignorant parents and has exerted it in varying degrees in almost every state. The only issue is, what government? State government alone, or federal government also? Just as state government through compulsory school laws, juvenile court or neglected and delinquent child legislation and child-labor legislation has had to control the selfish and ignorant parent in the interest of the child, so now it is proposed that the nation shall be able to control backward communities. How can it be said that national safe-guarding of the future citizenry, the future members of the nation, is out of harmony with the existing scheme of the Union? Must there continue to be a local autonomy to neglect to develop properly the nation of tomorrow?

It is no answer that cruel and inhuman treatment of children in the crude sense of immediate physical injury has largely been done away with; the program goes beyond this, it aims at the evil of consuming the time of the child during the period of possible development, to the denial of the opportunity for that development. The true scope of this child betterment movement is thus expressed by the author:

"There is no such thing as a child-labor problem pure and simple. The child-labor problem is a part of the general problem of child welfare, which in turn is part of the general problem of human welfare. It cannot be understood or solved by itself. What is child labor? Essentially, it is the labor of children that deprives them of a fair start in life, in the terms of health, play, education-and suitable work under home and school auspices or supervision, for there is a vast difference between child labor and children's work. Equally, child labor is the labor of children that deprives them of their rightful opportunities of living the life of childhood, fully, happily, in the only time of childhood. So we can say that taking children away from certain kinds of labor is at best only a partial solution of the problem, and that bringing to children the life they ought to have is at least a partial solution in itself. Not an unoccupied child but